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INTRODUCTION
Over the last several years, financial institutions have weathered many
storms; threats of insolvency1 prompted industry consolidation2 and the dis-
* Kristin Johnson, Professor of Law, Director of Regulation, Governance, and Risk Man-
agement Program, Seton Hall University Law School; Steven A. Ramirez, Professor of Law, As-
sociate Dean of Research & Faculty Development, Director, Business & Corporate Governance
Law Center, Loyola University Chicago.
1. See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 944
(2009).
2. See, e.g., Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Government Seizes WaMu and Sells Some
Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/business/26wamu.html?page
wanted=all (explaining the sale of Washington Mutual to JPMorgan and describing the aftermath);
Andrew Ross Sorkin, JPMorgan Pays $2 a Share for Bear Stearns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008,
www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/business/17bear.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing JPMor-
gan’s purchase of Bear Stearns); Wells Fargo to Buy Wachovia in $15.1 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2008, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/wells-fargo-to-merge-with-wachovia/ (dis-
cussing Wells Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia).
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tribution of an unprecedented bounty of federal financial aid.3 The narra-
tives of the storied enterprises that collapsed or nearly collapsed during the
recent financial crisis reveal a fundamental concern: existing external rules
and internal governing policies seem incapable of offering a sustainable
regulatory solution to individual firm and industry-wide risk management
failures.4
Theorists, commentators, journalists, and regulators quickly endeav-
ored to address the catalysts that led to the crisis and solutions to prevent
future crises.5 The reason for our preoccupation with identifying an effec-
tive regulatory framework is fairly obvious: the consequences of the crisis
continue to impact communities around the world.6 The resulting proposed
new legal standards aim to prevent excessive risk taking,7 encourage finan-
3. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-180, FINANCIAL REGULATORY
REFORM: FINANCIAL CRISIS LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT (2013).
4. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation and Responsibility
Failure, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781, 1797–98 (2013) (discussing how disintermediation in-
creases systemic risk and the potential for system-wide failure); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L.
REV. 951, 954 (2011) (discussing how the financial crisis revealed weaknesses in the regulatory
system of too big to fail financial institutions and how changes must be made to eliminate subsi-
dies and make institutions internalize their risks).
5. See, e.g., Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Statement on the Causes and
Current State of the Financial Crisis Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Jan. 14,
2010), available at http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/documents/view/2144; Viral V. Acharya & Mat-
thew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 CRITICAL REV. 195, 195 (2009) (suggesting
that the cause of the financial crisis was, at least in part, due to the behavior of large financial
institutions; explaining that financial institutions “had temporarily placed assets—such as securi-
tized mortgages—in off-balance-sheet entities, so that they did not have to hold significant capital
buffers against them . . . [and that] the capital regulations . . . allowed banks to reduce the amount
of capital they held against assets that remained on their balance sheets—if those assets took the
form of AAA-rated tranches of securitized mortgages. Thus, by repackaging mortgages into mort-
gage-backed securities, whether held on or off their balance sheets, banks reduced the amount of
capital required against their loans, increasing their ability to make loans many-fold. The principal
effect of this regulatory arbitrage, however, was to concentrate the risk of mortgage defaults in the
banks and render them insolvent when the housing bubble popped.”); Kurt Eggert, The Great
Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1258
(2009) (arguing that the securitization of mortgages incentivized riskier investing by Wall Street
firms); see also Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., The Fannie and Freddie Hate Storm, WALL ST. J., Dec.
28, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203391104577124403751459214
(claiming that too much blame is placed on Fannie and Freddie Mac, when the true cause of the
financial crisis was the fact that “giant financial institutions in the U.S. and Europe had leveraged
up with short-term and even overnight borrowings in order to hold complex mortgage derivatives
that suddenly became illiquid and hard to value”); Simon Mundy, ‘Financial Amnesia’ a Factor
Behind Crisis, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d5182878-2c99-11e1-8cca-
00144feabdc0.html (quoting the Chartered Financial Analyst Society of the UK’s argument that
“failure to heed the lessons of past bubbles was a key factor behind the global financial crisis” and
caused “risk to be mispriced, bubbles to develop and crises to break”).
6. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 9–11.
7. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (expressing that the purpose of the legislation
is to “promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and trans-
parency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by
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cial institution boards to engage in more careful monitoring,8 and enhance
oversight of previously unregulated or lightly regulated areas within finan-
cial markets.9 A common expectation weaves these goals together—con-
temporary regulatory reform assumes that reforms may be implemented
through the internal organizational structure of firms, or the top-down, hier-
archical oversight of the board of directors and senior executives.10 Regula-
tors’ increased reliance on internal organizational structures to manage
business risk exposes individual firms, the financial services industry, and
international macroeconomic goals, such as financial market stability, to the
well-known limits of corporate governance.
For decades, arguably almost a century, firms and regulatory authori-
ties have entrusted boards of directors to manage the business risks related
to the enterprise.11 Recent contributions to the well-established literature
chronicling the evolution of boards, however, question the qualifications,
impartiality, and decision-making processes of boards.12 Thus, while theo-
rists continue to debate the merits and limits of corporate governance,13 a
simple truth emerges—reliance on regulatory tools such as corporate gov-
ernance to address risk oversight must be carefully tailored, should abandon
antiquated notions about the efficacy of boards, and ought to acknowledge
the known cognitive limits of group decision-making and managers’ sus-
ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
purposes.”).
8. See id.; see also Kristin Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’
Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 56 (2011) [hereinafter
Addressing Gaps] (arguing that businesses need to adopt and enforce more effective risk manage-
ment strategies).
9. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 7.
10. See id.
11. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141 (2013) (identifying the powers of the board of direc-
tors); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codifying
the requirement of the CEO and CFO to sign financial statements certifying their accuracy); Stone
v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006) (holding a board was not liable for poor business deci-
sions as long as they acted with good faith); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d
959, 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (discussing the business judgment rule and how it protects a board of
directors); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682–85 (Mich. 1919) (discussing how the
board of directors has broad discretion to declare shareholder dividends as long as shareholders’
benefits are the main purpose); Addressing Gaps, supra note 8, at 98 (noting that the New York
Stock Exchange mandates that listed companies appoint independent directors and explaining that
NASDAQ’s listing standards have a similar requirement).
12. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 127
(2010) (highlighting the advantages of inside directors); Nicola Faith Sharpe, Informational Au-
tonomy in the Boardroom, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (2013) (arguing for more informa-
tional autonomy and a rethinking of the way boards make decisions).
13. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualiz-
ing Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (2014) (arguing that corporate boards would
benefit if firms were allowed to provide board services); Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary:
Puzzles About Corporate Boards and Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 841, 842–48 (2011) (ex-
plaining the function of boards and arguing that the value added by a diverse board of directors is
difficult to quantify); Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA.
L. REV. 2003, 2010–19 (2013) (discussing the side effects of shareholder primacy).
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ceptibility to pursue self-interest at the expense of the firm’s future stability.
Simply stated, risk management failures illustrate inherent weaknesses in
the theory and application of corporate governance and, in the context of
financial institutions, corporate governance breakdowns that trigger risk
management failures may engender systemic risks capable of destabilizing
our national economy and the economies of other nations around the world.
If these concerns have merit, we must question the implications of employ-
ing corporate governance reforms to address risk management oversight.14
Reflections on macroprudential regulatory goals may offer insight into the
most effective design for our national and international regulatory design.15
This Article identifies lessons from the recent financial crisis, explores
corporate governance-oriented regulatory reforms designed to enhance risk
management, and notes that the weaknesses in these reforms arise, in part,
because of romantic notions regarding corporate governance and its effi-
cacy. We conclude that the current regulatory and legal framework gov-
erning risk management in the financial services industry remains deficient
and dependent on corporate governance-based solutions to mitigate risk-
taking by financial institutions; this choice unnecessarily exposes our finan-
cial system and economy to the risk of further risk mismanagement
failures.16
14. See Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach to Regu-
lating Financial Markets, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 903–04 (2013) [hereinafter Macroprudential
Regulation] (explaining systemic risk and the consequences that flow from the interconnectedness
of financial institutions).
15. For examples of recent discussions regarding macroprudential regulatory design, see
Legislative Proposals to Reform Domestic Insurance Policy: Hearing on H.R.605, the Insurance
Consumer Protection and Solvency Act of 2013; H.R.4557, the Policyholder Protection Act of
2014; the Risk Retention Modernization Act of 2014; the Insurance Data Protection Act of 2014;
and H.R.4510, the Insurance Capital Standards Clarification Act of 2014 Before the H. Fin. Ser-
vices Subcomm. on Housing and Ins., 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Daniel Schwarcz, Assoc.
Prof. of Law, Distinguished Research Fellow at the Univ. of Minn. L. Sch.); J. DAVID CUMMINS &
MARY A. WEISS, SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE U.S. INSURANCE SECTOR 35–40 (2011) (arguing the
increased interconnectedness of the insurance industry and financial industry have also increased
the systemic risk of insurers and a larger scale approach is necessary to address the potential
threat), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1725512; Scott Harrington, The Financial Crisis,
Systemic Risk, and the Future of Insurance Regulation, 76 J. RISK & INS. 785, 811–15 (2009)
(arguing that the creation of a federal council to monitor insurance agencies and financial institu-
tions, and broadening federal control over insurers may be warranted); Daniel Schwarcz & Steven
L. Schwarz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (argu-
ing insurance regulation requires more federal government involvement rather than using state
law), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2404492; Rolf H. Weber, et. al., Addressing Systemic
Risk: Financial Regulatory Design, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 149, 178–200 (2014) (exploring current
and proposed regulations that anticipate important regulatory leadership by the Group of Twenty
(G20) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB)).
16. The losses from the risk mismanagement underlying the Great Financial Crisis of 2008
mounted to trillions in lost GDP worldwide, a massive run up in debt among governments world-
wide in efforts to save the economy from more pain, and the loss of personal wealth from declin-
ing asset prices, particularly housing and stock prices. While a final tally may be years away, it
will amount to tens of trillions of dollars globally. Full recovery has not yet been achieved. One
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This Article raises concerns about the extent to which financial market
reforms assume that changes in corporate governance will improve risk
management oversight. This Article rejects continued dependence on corpo-
rate governance reforms and endorses the adoption of a macroprudential
perspective regarding risk oversight. This Article concludes by initiating an
investigation into the contours of a macroprudential regulatory approach.
After introducing the theory of risk management, Part I offers examples
from the recent financial crisis that illustrate risk management failures. Part
II describes federal regulators and state courts’ adoption of prudential post-
crisis regulatory reforms effectuated through corporate governance. Part III
contends that nostalgic interpretations of corporate governance and its effi-
cacy undermine risk management and distract from the development of reg-
ulatory reforms that may effectively improve risk management and mitigate
systemic risk.
I. A PRIMER: RISK AND RISK MANAGEMENT
Employing risk management strategies is hardly a new approach to
mitigating the costs of undesirable risks.17 The concept of managing risks
dates back to the earliest annals of human history.18 Recently, however,
business risk management has evolved into a much more precise and so-
phisticated science; the marriage between mathematicians and Wall Street
firms transformed risk management into an art as each firm endeavored to
achieve superior financial performance through the use of mathematical
reckoning puts the total global tab at up to $15 trillion. Mark Adelson, The Deeper Causes of the
Financial Crisis: Mortgages Alone Cannot Explain It, 39 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 16, 16 (2013).
17. H. Felix Kloman, A Brief History of Risk Management, in ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGE-
MENT 19, 19 (John Fraser & Betty J. Simkins eds., 2010).
18. In the Old Testament, the story of Joseph’s interpretation of Pharaoh’s dream illustrates a
type of risk management approach to preserve access to food by preserving food during times of
exceptional harvest for years when crops failed to produce sufficient food for a nation.
Joseph . . . was sold into slavery by his brothers, but . . . became Pharaoh’s second-in-
command in Egypt . . . Through seven years of the most productive harvest Egypt had
seen, Joseph . . . reminded the Egyptians of the seven years of famine to come. Under
the authority of Pharaoh, he instituted a program through which Pharaoh required every
Egyptian farmer to place one-fifth of all produce harvested during the seven abundant
years into common storage silos located throughout the country. Joseph gathered the
food until he stopped measuring it, for it was beyond measure. . . . But then the seven
years of abundance ended, the famine began, and the people cried out to Pharaoh for
bread. The famine that followed extended beyond Egypt, so that even Joseph’s family in
Canaan had no food. But due to Joseph’s plan and enforcement, in all the land of Egypt
there was bread. In the later years of the famine, when Joseph foresaw the increasing
ability of the land to produce once more, Joseph instituted a second, more extreme
round of agricultural regulation. After the people of Egypt spent all they had on food,
Joseph accepted their livestock in exchange for food. The next year Joseph bought all of
the farm land in Egypt in exchange for food and moved all of the people into the cities
where Joseph had stored food. Joseph then ostensibly gave the land back to the farmers,
giving them seed and allowing them to farm the land for a tax of one-fifth of the pro-
duce, payable annually to the Pharaoh.
Genesis 41:1–32.
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models, an increasingly innovative array of financial products (such as
credit derivatives), and more sophisticated technology.19
In response to corporate governance failures in the early 2000s, schol-
ars increasingly focused on the best means of coordinating and managing
risk across the business enterprise.20 Yet, movement toward optimal risk
management proved illusory and incomplete.21 Part I of this Article will
review the evolution of this movement, prior to the financial meltdown of
2008. Section I.A. quickly surveys the history of risk management. Section
I.B. describes illustrations of risk management failures from the recent fi-
nancial crisis and contends that new changes contribute to increasing com-
plexity in financial markets and pose new and daunting hurdles for market
participants, regulators, and professionals in the financial services industry.
A. Understanding Risk and Risk Management
Risk is generally understood as the potential for a firm to experience
loss.22 Similar to the boards of other companies whose equity shares trade
on national securities exchanges, financial institution boards endeavor to
increase profitability while minimizing the firms’ exposure to undesirable
risks that lead to losses.23 A financial institution’s ability to identify and
19. “Risk-management practices and bank supervision have both evolved over their long
histories, but innovations in information technology and in financial markets have caused the pace
of change to increase significantly over the past two decades.” Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed.
Res., Speech at Stonier Graduate School of Banking: Modern Risk Management and Banking
Supervision (June 12, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
bernanke20060612a.htm.
20. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, Corporate Control and the Need for Meaningful Board
Accountability, 94 MINN. L. REV. 541, 555–59 (2010) (explaining how lawmakers and courts
should manage the actions of majority and activist minority stakeholders); Betty Simkins &
Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 571, 586–94 (2008) (arguing that enterprise-wide risk management would facilitate the
effective functioning of corporations and capital markets and explaining that the current legal
framework makes this goal impossible).
21. Notably, bank holding companies with more rigorous risk controls in place outperformed
bank holding companies without such controls during the crisis (2007–08) as well as over the long
term (1995–2010). Andrew Ellul & Vijay Yerramilli, Stronger Risk Controls, Lower Risk: Evi-
dence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 68 J. FIN. 1757, 1796 (2013).
22. The word “risk” derives from the Italian “risicare” (“to dare”). See Simkins & Ramirez,
supra note 20, at 577 (citing Peter L. Bernstein, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY
OF RISK 8 (1996)). Through the English language, “risk” adopted a connotation of “loss” or
“harm”: the earliest known English definition of the word, originating from 1621 (spelled
“risque”), defines risk as “(Exposure to) the possibility of loss, injury, or other adverse or unwel-
come circumstance; a chance or situation involving such a possibility.” OXFORD ENGLISH DIC-
TIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/166306?rskey=e0VgIy&result=1&isAdvanced=false#
eid (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
23. Nearly a century ago, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means posited that the separation of
ownership from control created a central and pervasive concern—the classic principle and agent
problem—in the management of the modern corporation. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4-9, 277–81 (1932). Hired execu-
tives, notwithstanding their allegiance to the corporation they serve, often have interests that di-
verge from the interests of the corporation or its shareholders. Id. After shareholders appoint
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quantify risks indisputably correlates to the success of the firm’s perform-
ance.24 Unfortunately for the boards of financial institutions, numerous
types of risks persistently threaten the board and executives’ ability to antic-
ipate risks.25
representatives to the board of directors of the firm and the board hires professional executives,
the owners of the firm no longer participate in the development of internal oversight policies or
daily management of the firm’s affairs. Id. Shareholders adopt governance policies to enable them
to monitor the activities of directors and executives, collectively managers. Id. See also Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) (arguing that “contractual relations are the
essence of a firm,” and that a firm is a “nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individ-
uals”) (emphasis omitted).
24. See THOMAS H. STANTON, WHY SOME FIRMS THRIVE WHILE OTHERS FAIL: GOVERNANCE
AND MANAGEMENT LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS (2012) (examining the organization, management,
and governance of large financial firms and correlating more developed risk management pro-
grams with better outcomes). JPMorgan elected not to engage in the market for mortgage-backed
collateralized debt obligations (“CDO”) because the risk managers at the firm perceived the in-
struments as dangerous. Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and Appli-
cation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 96–97 (2011). Thus, while JPMorgan’s equity share price declined
during the financial crisis, the losses were not as significant as the losses experienced by other
institutions. The closing share price of JPMorgan common stock was $46.70 in the third quarter of
2008 (“3Q08”); $43.82 in 3Q09; and $38.06 in 3Q10. Press Release, JPMorgan Chase Reports
Third Quarter 2008 Net Income of $527 Million, or $0.11 Per Share, Including Estimated Losses
of $640 Million (After-Tax) or $0.18 Per Share for Washington Mutual Merger-Related Items 15
(Oct. 15, 2008), http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/3535665722x0x240954/516966dc-
b596-47cc-9b21-0c22ccbd21a6/3Q08EarningsPressRelease.pdf; Press Release, JPMorgan Chase
Reports Third-Quarter 2009 Net Income of $3.6 Billion, or $0.82 Per Share 14 (Oct. 14, 2009),
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/3535665722x0x324142/7ea411e8-fad0-40e2-9ca6-
7a71607fb70e/3Q09_Earnings_Press_Release_FINAL.pdf; Press Release, JPMorgan Chase Re-
ports Third-Quarter 2010 Net Income of $4.4 Billion, or $1.01 Per Share, on Revenue of $24.3
Billion 15 (Oct. 13, 2010), http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/3602025084x0x409163/
14a3f375-5913-4c58-a4ce-3eb855569bf2/3Q10_Earnings_Press_Release.pdf.
Goldman Sachs originated CDOs, but acted solely as an agent and would not take any risk in
the transactions. In fact, Goldman Sachs knew that the CDOs were crossed to Paulson, a hedge
fund manager, who short sold the CDOs. The firm’s knowledge of Paulson’s actions ultimately
resulted in securities fraud litigation. Andrew F. Tuch, Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule
and Goldman Sachs, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 365, 395–96, n. 102 (2012). Goldman Sachs faired
even better than JPMorgan, with a consistent rise in the value of its common stock. The closing
share price of Goldman Sachs common stock was $99.30 in 3Q08; $101.39 in 3Q09; and $116.23
in 3Q10. Press Release, Goldman Sachs Reports 2008 Third Quarter Earnings Per Common Share
of $1.81 1 (Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/press-releases/
archived/2008/pdfs/2008-q3-earnings.pdf; Press Release, Goldman Sachs Reports Third Quarter
Earnings Per Common Share of $5.25 1 (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-
relations/press-releases/archived/2009/pdfs/2009-q3-earnings.pdf; Press Release, Goldman Sachs
Reports Third Quarter Earnings Per Common Share of $2.98 1 (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www
.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/press-releases/archived/2010/pdfs/2010-q3-earnings.pdf.
25. Credit, liquidity, and market risks are among the most significant classes of risks facing
financial institutions. Credit risk represents the likelihood that (1) a borrower will default on pay-
ments owed to the firm; and/or (2) loss will result to the firm from a decrease in the borrower’s
credit quality. Erik F. Gerding, Credit Derivatives, Leverage, and Financial Regulation’s Missing
Macroeconomic Dimension, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 29, 30 n. 8 (2011) (citing JOEL BESSIS, RISK
MANAGEMENT IN BANKING 12–13 (2d ed. 2002)). Because many investments are derived from
other investments or securities, credit risk multiplies and becomes increasingly difficult to quan-
tify as the degree of derivation escalates. Id. at 49. Liquidity risk encompasses two forms: (1)
trading-liquidity risk—the risk that the firm will be unable to find a counterparty to a transaction
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Financial institutions, however, serve a unique role in the domestic and
international economy. When the business units within a financial services
firm operate as desired, these institutions provide central services that offer
a plethora of positive benefits.26 The failure or insolvency of a financial
institution may engender losses that extend beyond the shareholders, direc-
tors, executives, employees, and other stakeholders associated with the
firm.27 If a financial institution’s failure triggers a series of losses across
financial markets, or the threat of such a shock (systemic risk), the negative
effects of the related events may certainly spill over and impact many indi-
viduals, families, and businesses in local and regional communities.28
The negative externalities of a series of financial firm failures may
possibly disrupt national or international financial markets. Due to the far-
reaching effects of systemic risks and the permanence of the perils that
systemic risks pose, legislators, academics, and journalists demand that
which is willing to purchase or sell the asset for fair market value; and (2) funding-liquidity risk—
the risk that a firm will be required to alter its daily operations or financial condition in order to
efficiently meet expected and unexpected current and future cash flow and collateral needs. Erik
F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk
Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 138 (2009). Liquidity risk is
difficult to model using market data because the risk occurs when markets seize up. Id. Market
risk is a broad, multi-factored assessment of how volatility in economic indicators (including
interest rate risk, foreign currency exchange rate risk, and commodity price risk) will affect the
performance of the firm’s investments. 17 C.F.R. § 229.305(a)(1) (2011); Robert T. Miller, Over-
sight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 61–62
(2010). Due to its massive macroeconomic scope, accurately calculating market risk is complex
and challenging. The collapse of large investment institutions is largely credited with their miscal-
culation of these risks. See generally Miller, supra note 25, at 61–62. For instance, AIG exposed
itself to credit risk, liquidity risk and market risk. P.M. Vasudev, Default Swaps and Director
Oversight: Lessons from AIG, 35 IOWA J. CORP. L. 757, 774 (2010). The cause of the recent
financial crisis is often attributed to the failure of firms to properly manage and disclose credit
risks regarding subprime lending. See The Long and the Short of It, ECONOMIST (Aug. 30, 2007),
http://www.economist.com/node/9725837.
26. A well-functioning, efficient market allows for predictability and stability in investments.
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities
Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 770 (1985) (describing how the efficient market hypothesis
theorizes that markets are efficient because “(1) the current price of a security best predicts its
future price and (2) the prevailing price immediately assimilates new information provided to the
market”). Well-functioning markets create greater access to financial information, which in turn
allocates resources to uses with the greatest value. Susan M. Phillips & Alan N. Rechtschaffen,
International Banking Activities: The Role of the Federal Reserve in Domestic Capital Markets,
21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1754, 1764 (1998) (“A noteworthy result of well-functioning capital mar-
kets is better information about issuers and readily available information on prices reflecting the
collective judgment of market participants about the earning potential and risk of the issuer.”). In
an efficient market, corporate managers are also incentivized to pursue and lobby for efficient
rules of corporate governance. Robert B. Ahdieh, Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implica-
tions of Federalism for Corporate Governance, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 255, 298 n. 172 (2009).
27. By the Treasury Department’s estimate, the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 resulted in
8.8 million jobs lost, $19.2 trillion lost in household wealth (in 2011 dollars), and a more than 5
percent fall in GDP. THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS RESPONSE IN CHARTS 3
(Apr. 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/Documents/20120413_Fi
nancialCrisisResponse.pdf.
28. Id.
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these institutions take special precautions to limit their exposure to certain
types of risk.29 Specifically, in the wake of the recent crisis, calls for re-
forms which manage the risks that impact individual financial institutions
as well as systemic risks dominate discussions regarding regulation of fi-
nancial markets.
After a careful examination of the varying definitions for the term,
Steven Schwarcz explains that systemic risk is:
The risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional
failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the fail-
ure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of signifi-
cant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in
the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced
by substantial financial-market price volatility.30
Anabtawi and Schwarcz explain that two independent correlations may
interact to engender localized economic shocks that have the potential to
crescendo into broader systemic crises.31 First, a firm’s financial integrity
and its exposure to the risk of low-probability adverse events may lead to
economic shocks.32 Second, the inter-institutional correlation among finan-
cial firms and markets may trigger events that disrupt a local, regional, or
national economy.33 Evidence suggests that similar risks threaten the stabil-
ity of individual firms and the correlation among firms within financial
markets. For example, an individual firm faces credit risk when trading with
counterparties pursuant to contracts that delay settlement.34 In a parallel
fashion, entire markets may face credit risk when a central intermediary,
such as a clearinghouse, fails and defaults on its obligations to members.35
In light of the fact that both intra-firm and inter-firm events may lead to
economic shocks, efforts by legislators and regulators to address economic
29. See, e.g., Systemic Regulation, Prudential Matters, Resolution Authority and Securitiza-
tion: Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on Fin. Services, 111th Cong.
(2009) (testimony of T. Timothy Ryan, Jr., President and CEO of the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association), available at democrats.financialservices.house.gov/media/file/
hearings/111/ryan_-_sifma.pdf (discussing the importance of and proposing changes to systemic
risk mediation proposals); Matthew Beville et al., An Information Market Proposal for Regulating
Systemic Risk, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 849, 870–80 (2010) (discussing how an information market
security could provide warning signs of systemic risk in the economy).
30. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008) (defining systemic risk
in terms of the consequences of economic shocks).
31. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Ana-
lytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1351 (2011).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Kristin Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons,
82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 206–14 (2011) (describing counterparty or credit risk in bilateral credit
derivatives agreements).
35. Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 UNIV. WASH.
L. REV. 185, 227 (2013).
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disruptions must, therefore, respond to the underlying risks that singularly,
or in the aggregate, create systemic risk concerns.
Theorists describe efforts to identify, quantify, or mitigate risks as risk
management.36 For centuries humans, communities, civilizations, empires,
nation states, and local and regional governments have endeavored to con-
trol and mitigate risk.37 Risk management has a long and colorful history.38
In contemporary periods, the study of risk management has gained signifi-
cant prominence and, in certain industries, risk management strategies in-
fluence each aspect of business conduct in the sector and every decision of
executives and rank-and-file employees. For example, managing and miti-
gating risk is a central component of the business plans and strategies of
firms operating in the nuclear power,39 oil and gas extraction and distribu-
tion, and financial services industries.40
36. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Lapine et al., BANKING LAW 3-80 § 80.12 (2014) (describing how
banks are required to keep a certain amount of capital as a cushion to protect depositors and the
FDIC from suffering excessive losses); Robert F. Weber, An Alternative Story of the Law and
Regulation of Risk Management, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1005, 1010–15 (2013) (explaining the
purpose of risk management and how it relates to risk assessment and risk control). See generally
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 982
(2009) (highlighting the importance of risk management for reducing and limiting risks); Peter L.
Bernstein, The New Religion of Risk Management, HARV. BUS. REV. 47 (1996) (considering the
modern probability theory approach to risk management as blind-faith allegiance to the
“supercomputer”); Miller, supra note 25, at 53 (discussing efforts to improve risk management at
large firms); Eric J. Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A Critical Assessment of the
Delaware Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209, 216–17 (2011) (proposing that a board’s fiduci-
ary duty to monitor should include investment in risk management systems); Cyrus Sanati, Crisis-
Shaken Executives Sharpen Focus on Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, http://dealbook.nytimes
.com/2010/08/10/crisis-shaken-executives-sharpen-focus-on-risk/ (noting the increasing emphasis
corporate executives place on risk management); Financial Institutions Increase Risk Manage-
ment Focus and Resources, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2013, http://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcomp-
liance/2013/11/11/financial-institutions-increase-risk-management-focus-and-resources/
(elaborating on institutions’ attempt to increase expenditures on quantifying and analyzing risk).
37. Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 20, at 577 (“Managing risk, or what is commonly re-
ferred to as ‘risk management,’ is a concept that dates back thousands of years to when early
visionaries tried to understand risk, manage aspects of risk that were manageable, and weigh the
consequences of what they could not manage.”).
38. Id.
39. See RICHARD A. POSNER, RISK AND RESPONSE v (2004) (discussing how nuclear power
businesses rely on risk assessment and mitigation); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community
of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 442–43 (2011)
(explaining how the nuclear power industry has been able to efficiently self-regulate).
40. See generally Simone M. Sepe, Regulating Risk and Governance in Banks: A Con-
tractarian Perspective, 62 EMORY L.J. 327, 334–35 (proposing the appointment of a chief risk
officer (“CRO”) as well as a completely independent board of directors to impartially review the
risk assessments of the CEO and CRO); Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 20, at 580–81 (“Enter-
prise-wide risk management, or ERM, first emerged as a recognized new approach to risk man-
agement in the 1990s. ERM . . . is a natural evolution of the process of risk management, and
represents a more advanced and sophisticated approach to managing risk.”); Robert Weber, A
Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2236, 2240 (“De-
liberation-oriented stress testing privileges dynamic scenarios, draws from business operations
culture, relies on imagination, considers the interactivity of tested variables, remains open-ended
and uncertain outcomes, and is motivated by governance concerns.”); Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, Cor-
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Recent risk management studies and the development of more sophis-
ticated mechanisms to control and safeguard against risk have enhanced
risk management oversight.41 The most recent innovations revolve around
the notion that the firm should avoid “risk silos” and instead seek to quan-
tify and coordinate risk across the business enterprise.42 Naturally, this ef-
fort must be coordinated at the highest managerial levels of the firm as only
senior management holds the authority and the firm-wide perspective to
survey all sources of risk throughout the business.43 This integrated, contin-
uous, and comprehensive approach to risk management and coordination at
the highest managerial levels of the firm emerged in the 1990s as enter-
prise-wide risk management, or ERM.44
Perhaps the most influential and long-standing framework governing
ERM was promulgated by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of
the Treadway Commission (COSO).45 Originally published in 1994, COSO
published an updated version in September of 2004 (in response to the man-
ifest deficiencies in risk management revealed in the Enron corporate gov-
ernance crisis).46 Entitled Enterprise Risk Management—Integrated
Framework, this framework provides guidance to firms to strive toward op-
timal ERM, which COSO suggests aligns risk appetite to strategy, reduces
operational losses, broadly views all potential risks as opportunities to build
porate Governance Symposium: The Evolving Concept of Operational Risk and its Regulatory
Treatment, 9 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 105, 107 (2003) (explaining that Operational Risk Management
evaluates the risks of “inadequate systems, controls or human error”).
41. See Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 20, at 580–81.
42. Id. at 581(“Under ERM, all risk areas function as parts of an integrated, strategic, and
enterprise-wide system. While risk management is coordinated with senior-level oversight, em-
ployees at all levels of the organization using ERM are encouraged to view risk management as an
integral and ongoing part of their jobs.”).
43. Id. at 583 (“ERM is now developing into a tool that can be used to enhance firm value.
For example, security rating agencies such as Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s
(“S&P”) include whether a company has an ERM system as a factor in their ratings methodology
for financial institutions and insurance companies.”).
44. Id. at 581. See also Weber, supra note 36, at 1005 (reviewing the history of risk manage-
ment and arguing that the recent regulatory focus on risk management is more of a “cultural
crutch in response to growing anxiety about endemic uncertainty” than a realistic regulatory effort
to achieve financial stability and the safety and soundness of financial institutions).
45. “The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) is a
joint initiative of the five private sector organizations . . . and is dedicated to . . . the development
of frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management, internal control and fraud deter-
rence.” Welcome to COSO, COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COM-
MISSION, http://www.coso.org/default.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2014). “COSO was organized in
1985 . . . by the American Accounting Association, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Financial Executives International, The Institute of Internal Auditors, and the Na-
tional Association of Accountants (now the Institute of Management Accountants).” About Us,
COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, http://www.coso
.org/aboutus.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2014).
46. See COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, EN-
TERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK v (2004), available at http://www.coso
.org/documents/COSO_ERM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf
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value, and improves the deployment of capital through risk disclosure.47 In
terms of corporate governance, according to COSO, ERM requires that the
CEO bear ultimate responsibility for enterprise risk management but “the
board of directors provides important oversight to enterprise risk manage-
ment, and is aware of and concurs with the entities risk appetite.”48 A risk
officer usually will play a key support role.49 Further, the board should
discuss risk management with senior management and “ensure it is apprised
of the most significant risks, along with actions management is taking to
and how it is ensuring effective risk management.”50 Finally, COSO recog-
nizes the utility of the board seeking input from internal and external audi-
tors and other consultants.51
Aside from its focus on ERM, COSO recognizes the importance of
internal controls52 not only as mechanisms to secure audit integrity but also
to detect financial irregularities within firms.53 After a series of disturbing
corporate governance failures in late 2001 and early 2002 (beginning with
the Enron scandal and culminating in the WorldCom scandal), Congress
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.54 Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 enhanced the legal and regulatory framework securing the internal
controls of U.S. publicly traded corporations by placing the responsibility
for internal controls on management.55 Sections 302 and 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act reinforce this responsibility by imposing both civil and
47. Id. at 1 (“In sum, enterprise risk management helps an entity get to where it wants to go
and avoid pitfalls and surprises along the way.”).
48. Id. at 6.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 6–7.
51. See id. at 7.
52. “Internal control is a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management, and
other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives
relating to operations, reporting, and compliance.” COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, INTERNAL CONTROL—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 3 (2013), http://
www.coso.org/documents/990025P_Executive_Summary_final_may20_e.pdf
53. According to COSO:
When a system of internal control is determined to be effective, senior management and
the board of directors have reasonable assurance, relative to the application within the
entity structure, that the organization:
Achieves effective and efficient operations when external events are considered
unlikely to have a significant impact on the achievement of objectives or where the
organization can reasonably predict the nature and timing of external events and
mitigate the impact to an acceptable level[;]
Understands the extent to which operations are managed effectively and efficiently
when external events may have a significant impact on the achievement of objec-
tives or where the organization can reasonably predict the nature and timing of
external events and mitigate the impact to an acceptable level[;]
Prepares reports in conformity with applicable rules, regulations, and standards or
with the entity’s specified reporting objectives[;] and
Complies with applicable laws, rules, regulations, and external standards[.]
Id. at 8.
54. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012).
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criminal penalties on senior officers (the CEO and CFO in particular) for
false certifications of annual and quarterly reports, including internal con-
trol certifications.56 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB)57 subsequently issued a new auditing standard requiring a top-
down risk assessment (including a fraud/risk assessment) of a firm’s con-
trols to assess “overall risks to internal control over financial reporting.”58
These legally mandated risk assessments dovetail and further the core con-
cept of ERM—that firms should identify, assess, and manage all potential
risks to the firm. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, although primarily focused on
audit quality, ultimately requires the very broad risk assessment that essen-
tially drives ERM.
Another source of support for ERM is the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE)59 listing requirements.60 The NYSE mandates that all listed firms
have audit committees and that these committees play a mandatory supervi-
sory risk management role.61 The full NYSE commentary provides:
While it is the job of the CEO and senior management to assess
and manage the company’s exposure to risk, the audit committee
must discuss guidelines and policies to govern the process by
which this is handled. The audit committee should discuss the
company’s major financial risk exposures and the steps manage-
ment has taken to monitor and control such exposures. The audit
committee is not required to be the sole body responsible for risk
assessment and management, but, as stated above, the committee
must discuss guidelines and policies to govern the process by
which risk assessment and management is undertaken. Many
56. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
57. “The PCAOB is a nonprofit corporation established by Congress to oversee the audits of
public companies in order to protect investors and the public interest by promoting informative,
accurate, and independent audit reports.” About the PCAOB, PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING
OVERSIGHT BOARD, http://pcaobus.org/about/pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2014); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2012) (“There is established the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, to oversee the audit of companies that are subject to the securities laws, and related mat-
ters, in order to protect the interests of investors.”).
58. PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD, RELEASE NO. 2007-005A, AUDITING
STANDARD NO. 5 (Nov. 15, 2007), http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/Auditing_Stan
dard_5.aspx#usingtopdownapproach.
59. The NYSE is a self-regulatory organization (SRO) subject to plenary SEC oversight. The
SEC has the power to “abrogate, add to, and delete from” any SRO rule. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c)
(2012). In addition, the SEC may enforce SRO rules. See id. § 78u(d)(1). The SEC is also empow-
ered to sanction SROs that fail in their supervisory role. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) & (c). The SEC
reviews any SRO sanction de novo. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e)(1).
60. Listing requirements are SRO rules governing the firms that trade on an SRO securities
exchange. Thus, on November 4, 2003, the SEC approved the NYSE Corporate Governance
Rules. See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM., RELEASE NO. 34-48745, NASD AND NYSE RULEMAK-
ING: RELATING TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-
48745.htm.
61. Listed Company Manual: § 303A.07(b)(iii)(D), Audit Committee Additional Require-
ments, NYSE (2013), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=
chp%5F1%5F4%5F3%5F8&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F.
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companies, particularly financial companies, manage and assess
their risk through mechanisms other than the audit committee.
The processes these companies have in place should be reviewed
in a general manner by the audit committee, but they need not be
replaced by the audit committee.62
This mandated risk assessment implicit in the NYSE Corporate Governance
Rules creates yet another foundation for a robust ERM function. Further,
the NYSE specifically contemplates collaborative risk management with
clear direction from the board.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is the
world’s largest developer of voluntary international standards to facilitate
commerce and global trade.63 ISO 31000 is an international standard for
risk management which the ISO first proposed in 2007.64 The ISO approach
to ERM revolves around five basic steps: (1) identify and assess threats,
(2) assess firm vulnerability, (3) determine the risk of loss, (4) identify risk
reduction options, and (5) prioritize risk reduction based on firm strategy.
The ISO approach notably views risk as both a threat and an opportunity.
Thus, risk under ISO Guide 73 is no longer defined as “chance or
probability of loss” but “the effect of uncertainty on objectives.”65
On the cusp of the subprime bubble, both of the major credit ratings
agencies, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s began to consider a firm’s use of
ERM as a factor in rating the quality of firm debt obligations. The Moody’s
approach, as well as the S&P approach, mirrors the approach of other au-
thoritative voices, discussed above, regarding the key substantive elements
of ERM. Specifically, both require a comprehensive identification and as-
sessment of all sources of risk across the business enterprise, both empha-
size the key role of the board in participating in the management and
definition of the firm’s risk profile, and both concur that this process should
seek to mitigate or at least control risk.66 Both ratings agencies defined
62. Id.
63. About ISO, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm
(last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
64. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, COMMITTEE DRAFT OF ISO 31000 RISK MANAGE-
MENT—GUIDELINES ON PRINCIPLES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT (2007). The
final ISO standard was published in 2009 and included accompanying publications addressing risk
management techniques and risk management vocabulary. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
ISO 31000:2009 RISK MANAGEMENT—PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES (2009).
65. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO TECH. MGMT. BOARD WORKING GROUP, ISO
Guide 73:2009, definition 1.1 (2009).
66. See MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, MOODY’S FINDINGS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: AUGUST 2003–SEPTEMBER 2004 (2004), available at https://
www.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/2003000000429471.pdf.
This is how Moody’s summarizes its approach:
Increasing numbers of companies are undertaking enterprise-level approaches to risk—a
more encompassing and systematic review of potential risks and their mitigation than
most companies have undertaken in the past. Business units are tasked with identifying
risks and, where possible, quantifying and determining how to mitigate them. These
assessments typically are rolled up to a corporate level, sometimes with direct input
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ERM similarly and both agencies assessed a firm’s commitment to ERM as
one factor in rating the firm’s securities on the brink of the Great Financial
Crisis of 2008.67 This approach to ERM is the version of ERM that shows
the most robust gains in firm value and financial performance.68 Under this
approach, board involvement is critical.
Ultimately, ERM promised to usher in a new era of superior banking
stability. Thus, in 2003 Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan argued that
a wide variety of new financial instruments—known as derivatives69—al-
from the board or audit committee. These assessments have often been relatively broad,
focusing on reputation, litigation, product development, and health and safety risks,
rather than focusing solely on financial risks. Where we have seen these assessments
implemented, we have commented favorably, particularly when the board or the audit
committee is actively involved.
Id. at 13.
67. See STANDARD & POOR’S, STANDARD & POOR’S TO APPLY ENTERPRISE RISK ANALYSIS
TO CORPORATE RATINGS (2008), available at http://www.nyu.edu/intercep/ERM%20for%20Non-
Financial%20Companies%205.7.08.pdf. Here is the summary of the S&P approach:
We see ERM as:
An approach to assure the firm is attending to all risks;
A set of expectations among management, shareholders, and the board about which
risks the firm will and will not take;
A set of methods for avoiding situations that might result in losses that would be
outside the firm’s tolerance;
A method to shift focus from “cost/benefit” to “risk/reward”;
A way to help fulfill a fundamental responsibility of a company’s board and senior
management;
A toolkit for trimming excess risks and a system for intelligently selecting which
risks need trimming; and
A language for communicating the firm’s efforts to maintain a manageable risk
profile.
Id. at 2.
68. A recent study found:
Using ERM quality (ERMQ) ratings of financial companies by Standard & Poor’s, we
find that higher ERMQ is associated with greater complexity, less resource constraint,
and better corporate governance. Controlling for such characteristics, we find that higher
ERMQ is associated with improved accounting performance. Results show a market
reaction to signals of enhanced management control from initial ERMQ ratings and
rating revisions, and a stronger response to earnings surprises for firms with higher
ERMQ. Focusing on the recent global financial crisis, our analysis suggests that there is
no relation between ERM quality and market performance prior to and during the mar-
ket collapse. However, returns of higher ERMQ companies are higher during the market
rebound. Overall, results reveal that firm performance and value are enhanced by high
quality controls that integrate risk management efforts across the firm, enabling better
oversight of managers’ risk-taking behavior, and aligning that behavior with the strate-
gic direction of the company.
Ryan Baxter, et al., Enterprise Risk Management Program Quality: Determinants, Value Rele-
vance, and the Financial Crisis, CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1264, 1264 (2013). Many studies assessing
the efficacy of ERM prior to the crisis fail to consider that many firms implement ERM programs
in response to poor financial performance or suspect risk taking by the CEO. See DONALD
PAGACH & RICHARD WARR, AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRMS
ADOPTING ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT (2007), available at http://www.ermsymposium.org/
pdf/papers/Pagach.pdf. Naturally, this would skew the financial performance of firms adopting
ERM downward.
69. The Financial Times defines a derivative instrument as a “financial instrument whose
value is based on the performance of underlying assets such as stocks, bonds currency exchange
rates, real estate.” Derivatives, FINANCIAL TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=derivatives
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lowed financial firms to transfer and customize their risk profiles to meet
their risk appetite, and thereby allow financial firms to meet external shocks
with greater flexibility;70 this in turn made the entire financial system more
resilient.71 Simply put, the transfer and management of risk increased as
risk became more dispersed and increasingly rested in the hands of those
most desirous of risk. In 2006, Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke also
haled advances in the risk management efforts of financial institutions.72
New financial instruments such as derivatives gave banks the ability to deal
with credit risk on a portfolio-wide basis rather than focus solely on indi-
vidual loan underwriting.73 Sophisticated mathematical models permitted
banks to quantify and hence manage risk with superior precision.74 Accord-
ing to Chairman Bernanke, “large, complex banking organizations” now
held superior tools “for identifying, measuring, and managing their risks.”75
(last visited Jan. 7, 2015). Derivatives can be traded over an exchange or can be customized
between private parties in which case they are called over-the-counter derivatives. Id. The com-
plexity of derivatives is limited only by the imaginations of lawyers who draft the derivatives
agreement and the mathematicians who model them. Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives,
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1993, 2005–06 (1995).
70. The Economist succinctly stated the benefits that derivatives offer:
In many ways, these complex derivatives are good for economies. Because they allow
investors to lay off the risk of borrowers’ defaults, they free lenders to lend more. Be-
cause risk is dispersed to those who have an appetite for it, the system should be more
robust. Because derivatives are traded in liquid markets, they rapidly transmit informa-
tion about the creditworthiness of borrowers. The benefits of this hyperactive shuffling
of money spread well beyond financial markets. If companies are borrowing more
cheaply and sensibly to make acquisitions, pay dividends and buy back their own shares,
businesses everywhere should run more efficiently.
The Dark Side of Debt, ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 2006, http://www.economist.com/node/7943243.
Presciently, the Economist also recognized the dark side of these new instruments:
Regulators understand very well how much the world stands to gain from this revolution
in finance, but they are nevertheless nervous. Because of the lack of transparency, they
cannot see whether these volatile new debt instruments are in safe hands or how they
will behave in a crisis when everyone is heading for the exits.
Id.
71. Greenspan spoke in compelling terms regarding the promise of risk management:
The use of a growing array of derivatives and the related application of more-sophisti-
cated methods for measuring and managing risk are key factors underpinning the en-
hanced resilience of our largest financial intermediaries. Derivatives have permitted
financial risks to be unbundled in ways that have facilitated both their measurement and
their management. Because risks can be unbundled, individual financial instruments
now can be analyzed in terms of their common underlying risk factors, and risks can be
managed on a portfolio basis. Concentrations of risk are more readily identified, and
when such concentrations exceed the risk appetites of intermediaries, derivatives can be
employed to transfer the underlying risks to other entities. As a result, not only have
individual financial institutions become less vulnerable to shocks from underlying risk
factors, but also the financial system as a whole has become more resilient.
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Res., Remarks at the 2003 Conference on Bank Structure and
Competition, Chicago, Illinois: Corporate Governance (May 8, 2003), available at http://www
.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20030508/.
72. See Bernanke, supra note 19.
73. Id. at ¶ 8–9.
74. Id. at ¶ 11.
75. Id. at ¶ 27.
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In fact, “banking organizations of all sizes have made substantial strides
over the past two decades in their ability to measure and manage risks.”76
The endorsement of modern risk management techniques and instru-
ments from two consecutive Fed Chairs highlights the immense potential
that ERM holds to stabilize the financial sector, limit the risk of financial
firm failure, and facilitate greater macroeconomic stability. Yet, the crisis of
2008 belies this promise; in fact, a key issue lurked unresolved.77 ERM
practices and law simply did not recognize the great harm that CEOs could
inflict through risk manipulation for profit.78 The next section will seek to
highlight why ERM failed to enhance financial stability and to protect the
financial sector from mass insolvency through an analysis of the best evi-
dence available regarding the risk mismanagement at the center of the
crisis.
Moreover, ERM does not reach the second category of risks that
Schwarcz and Anatawbi describe as inter-firm dynamics. Section B of this
Part chronicles the economic shocks that challenged financial markets dur-
ing the recent financial crisis. The narratives below offer clear support for
the conclusion that the regulatory framework adopted prior to the recent
financial crisis insufficiently addresses both intra-firm and inter-firm corre-
lations that engender systemic risk concerns.
76. Id. See also Eric S. Rosengren, President & CEO, Speech at the Conference on New
Challenges for Operational Risk Measurement and Management: Risk-Management Lessons from
Recent Financial Turmoil (May 14, 2008) (similar statement of Boston Federal Reserve Bank
President made later in the crisis), available at http://www.bostonfed.org/news/speeches/rosen-
gren/2008/051408.htm.
77. Certain commentators identified the key issue of CEO autonomy and independence of the
risk management function early on, but concluded that the evidence available at that time justified
only more limited disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws. E.g., Simkins & Rami-
rez, supra note 20, at 591–92. Later, as the crisis unfolded and more evidence emerged regarding
the massive risk mismanagement that drove the crisis more commentators recognized that the risk
function cannot succeed without independence. See GABRIELE SABATO, FINANCIAL CRISIS: WHERE
DID RISK MANAGEMENT FAIL? 14 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1460762 (“The
Chief Risk Officer (CRO) is still not [sitting with] the Board of most banks,” most risk managers
still report to the CEO, and concluding that this “risk structure has clearly proved not to be
appropriate.”).
78. See ANETTE MIKES, RISK MANAGEMENT AT CRUNCH TIME: ARE CHIEF RISK OFFICERS
COMPLIANCE CHAMPIONS OR BUSINESS PARTNERS? 1 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1138615 (investigating the role chief risk officers at 15 international banks prior to the
financial crisis and finding that while “the role of chief risk officers (CROs) had expanded dramat-
ically” there still was lack of clarity between the role of “Strategic Advisor” and the role of
“Strategic Controller” which posed the “danger of an expectations gap opening around particular
risk management approaches” among key stakeholders).
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B. Risk Management Failures Engender Financial Crises
Countrywide Financial originated, serviced, and packaged more sub-
prime loans than any other firm.79 Countrywide engaged in reprehensible
lending practices; in fact, ultimately Countrywide settled allegations of
predatory lending asserted by eleven states for over $8 billion, the largest
such settlement in history.80 The states alleged that Countrywide lied about
its “no closing cost loans,” misled consumers with respect to hidden fees,
structured loans with risky features, paid brokers more to originate higher
risk loans, and frequently originated based upon inflated borrowers’ income
(without borrower involvement).81 The New York Times interviewed former
employees82 that corroborated (and documented) many of these allega-
tions.83 The profits generated through lax lending standards and fees were
so significant that Countrywide continued its reckless84 lending even after
delinquency rates soared.85 “As such, the company is Exhibit A for the lax
and, until recently, highly lucrative lending that has turned a once-hot busi-
ness ice cold and has touched off a housing crisis of historic proportions.”86
Anthony Mozilo, the firm’s CEO, knew that Countrywide exposed it-
self to lethal risks from its subprime loans. In one email, Mozilo correctly
described one of Countrywide’s loan products as “[p]oison.”87 He elabo-
rated: “In all my years in the business I have never seen a more toxic [prod-
79. David Olive, Corporate Rewards for Failure, THESTAR.COM, Feb. 1, 2008, http://www
.thestar.com/columnists/article/299415 (reporting that Countrywide CEO sold $400 million in
stock between 2005 and 2008).
80. Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide to Set Aside $8.4 Billion in Loan Aid, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/06/business/06countrywide.html.
81. Id.
82. Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/business/yourmoney/26country.html?pagewanted=all (“Such
loans were made, former employees say, because they were so lucrative—to Countrywide. The
company harvested a steady stream of fees or payments on such loans and busily repackaged them
as securities to sell to investors.”).
83. Id. (“One document, for instance, shows that until last September the computer system in
the company’s subprime unit excluded borrowers’ cash reserves, which had the effect of steering
them away from lower-cost loans to those that were more expensive to homeowners and more
profitable to Countrywide.”).
84. See id. (“The company would lend even if the borrower had been 90 days late on a
current mortgage payment twice in the last 12 months, if the borrower had filed for personal
bankruptcy protection, or if the borrower had faced foreclosure or default notices on his or her
property.”).
85. See id. (“One reason these loans were so lucrative for Countrywide is that investors who
bought securities backed by the mortgages were willing to pay more for loans with prepayment
penalties and those whose interest rates were going to reset at higher levels.”).
86. Id. (“[T]he profit margins Countrywide generated on subprime loans that it sold to inves-
tors were 1.84 percent, versus 1.07 percent on prime loans. A year earlier, when the subprime
machine was really cranking, sales of these mortgages produced profits of 2 percent, versus 0.82
percent from prime mortgages.”).
87. THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (2011) [hereinafter
FCIC], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
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uct].”88 He even knew the firm’s viability was at stake. He stated that firms
that follow the lead of other lenders in making high-risk loans go “broke.”89
Yet, Mozilo and Countrywide continued to originate massive subprime
loans.90 The chief risk officer at Countrywide never objected to these lethal
high-risk loans but instead affirmatively acted to facilitate the lending.91
Finally, this risky lending relied upon high levels of short-term debt for
funding.92
Mozilo garnered outrageous compensation for leading Countrywide
into the subprime pit.93 In 2006, Mozilo’s compensation amounted to $102
million, which included a bonus of $20.5 million for increasing earnings at
Countrywide from $4.11 per share in 2005 to $4.62 per share in 2006.94 In
2007, Mozilo exercised stock options, hauling in $127 million, just prior to
the announcement on July 24, 2007 that Countrywide would write down
$388 million in loan losses.95 In 2007, Mozilo earned an additional $102
million in salary and $30 million in options compensation.96 He retired in
2008 with a $58 million benefit.97 For the entire year of 2007, Countrywide
lost $704 million, as 33% of its subprime mortgages were delinquent.98
Shareholders lost over 80% of the value of their shares, relative to their
value before the credit crisis.99 Ultimately, Countrywide was acquired by
Bank of America—where its subprime portfolio may have inflicted up to
$33 billion in additional loan losses according to one analyst.100
Bank of America also paid the great weight of Angelo Mozilo’s SEC
fine for insider trading. The SEC alleged that Mozilo sold Countrywide
shares to investors without disclosure of known risks arising from high-risk
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 108.
91. See id. at 174.
92. See id. at 248 (“On August 2, [2007] . . . Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo realized that
his company was unable to roll its commercial paper or borrow on the repo market. ‘When we talk
about [August 2] at Countrywide, that’s our 9/11.’”).
93. See Olive, supra note 79.
94. James J. Bicksler, The Subprime Mortgage Debacle and its Linkages to Corporate Gov-
ernance, 5 INT’L J. OF DISCL. & GOVERN. 295, 296 (2008).
95. Id. at 296–97.
96. Id. at 297.
97. Id.
98. Roddy Boyd, Countrywide: From Bad to Worse: The Troubled Lender Posted a $422
Million Loss and Revealed That a Third of Its Subprime Loans are Delinquent, FORTUNE, Jan. 29,
2008, http://archive.fortune.com/2008/01/29/news/companies/boyd_countrywide.fortune/index
.htm.
99. Bank of America and Countrywide: Fingers Crossed, ECONOMIST, June 28, 2008, http://
www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-204985789.html.
100. Bank of America Faces Lingering Financial Woes from Countrywide: Report,
MARKETWATCH, Feb. 8, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bank-america-faces-lingering-
financial-woes.
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mortgage lending.101 On the eve of trial the case settled for $73 million.
Bank of America (and its insurance) paid all but $22 million.102 As such,
the Mozilo fine only represents a small fraction of the $500 million that
Mozilo took from 2000–2008 as Countrywide’s CEO.103 Put simply, the
high risks that sunk Countrywide were not “poison” for Mozilo.
Washington Mutual (WaMu) was the nation’s largest thrift, until it be-
came the nation’s largest bank failure.104 Four elements of WaMu’s busi-
ness epitomized reckless lending: first, “WaMu gave mortgage brokers
handsome commissions for selling the riskiest loans, which carried higher
fees, bolstering profits and ultimately the compensation of the bank’s exec-
utives;” second, “WaMu pressed sales agents to pump out loans while dis-
regarding borrowers’ incomes and assets;” third, “[t]he bank set up what
insiders described as a system of dubious legality that enabled real estate
agents to collect fees of more than $10,000 for bringing in borrowers,
sometimes making the agents more beholden to WaMu than they were to
their clients;” and fourth, “WaMu pressured appraisers to provide inflated
property values that made loans appear less risky, enabling Wall Street to
bundle them more easily for sale to investors.”105 It suffered mortgage-re-
lated losses in excess of $11 billion in 2008.106 WaMu’s CEO received $88
million in pay between 2001 and 2007.107 Yet, the loan losses “wipe[d] out
all of its earnings from 2005 and 2006 and three months’ worth of profits
101. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm., Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo to
Pay SEC’s Largest-Ever Financial Penalty Against a Public Company’s Senior Executive (Oct.
15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-197.htm (stating that Mozilo
“deliberately disregarded his duties to investors by concealing what he saw from inside the execu-
tive suite—a looming disaster in which Countrywide was buckling under the weight of increasing
risky mortgage underwriting, mounting defaults and delinquencies, and a deteriorating business
model”).
102. Walter Hamilton & E. Scott Reckard, Angelo Mozilo, Other Former Countrywide Execs
Settle Fraud Charges L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/16/business/
la-fi-mozilo-sec-20101016.
103. Peter J. Henning, When Disgorgement Comes Cheap, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2010, http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/when-disgorgement-comes-cheap/.
104. See Jon Talton, WaMu’s Loyal Shareholders Left Holding the Empty Bag, SEATTLE
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/jontalton/2008368307_biztaltoncol09
.html. See also STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PERMANENT
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANAT-
OMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 2 [hereinafter LEVIN-COBURN REPORT], available at http://www
.levin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/supporting/2011/PSI_WallStreetCrisis_041311.pdf (describing
how “[a]t the time of its failure, WaMu was the nation’s largest thrift and sixth largest bank, with
$300 billion in assets, $188 billion in deposits, 2,300 branches in 15 states, and over 43,000
employees”).
105. Peter S. Goodman & Gretchen Morgenson, Saying Yes to Anyone, WaMu Built Empire
on Shaky Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/business/
28wamu.html (interviewing twenty-four former employees and others who did business with
WaMu, who portrayed the thrift’s business in a manner consistent with 89 confidential witnesses
from a shareholders suit against WaMu management).
106. See id.
107. Id.
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generated in 2004.”108 When the profits disappeared, the CEO still kept his
“performance” compensation.109
The bi-partisan Levin-Coburn Report found that WaMu suffered major
risk management flaws prior to its failure at the height of the financial cri-
sis.110 Its primary regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) chided
WaMu for risk management flaws for each of the five examinations prior to
WaMu’s failure.111 Yet, the OTS took no enforcement action.112
American International Group (AIG), once the world’s largest insur-
ance company, lost more than any other firm in history—amounting to
$61.7 billion in the fourth quarter of 2008.113 The AIG Financial Products
unit, which caused the catastrophic losses through massive derivatives trad-
ing, was unregulated—but was backed by the full credit and guarantee of
the parent company. Fed Chair Ben Bernanke maintained that AIG “ex-
ploited a huge gap in the regulatory system” and operated as an unregulated
hedge fund that “made huge numbers of irresponsible bets.”114 Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner concurred, calling AIG a hedge fund that grew
“without any adult supervision.”115 The Treasury Secretary and the Fed
Chair speak with particular authority since they engineered the bailout of
AIG, which left the United States as the owner of nearly 80 percent of the
firm.116
108. Gretchen Morgenson, Gimme Back Your Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/business/22pay.html.
109. Id.
110. LEVIN-COBURN REPORT, supra note 104, at 4.
111. Id. (“[D]uring the five years prior to WaMu’s collapse, OTS examiners repeatedly identi-
fied significant problems with Washington Mutual’s lending practices, risk management, asset
quality, and appraisal practices, and requested corrective action. Year after year, WaMu promised
to correct the identified problems, but never did.”).
112. Id. (“OTS failed to respond with meaningful enforcement action, such as by downgrading
WaMu’s rating for safety and soundness, requiring a public plan with deadlines for corrective
actions, or imposing civil fines for inaction. To the contrary, until shortly before the thrift’s failure
in 2008, OTS continually rated WaMu as financially sound.”).
113. Hugh Son & Margaret Popper, AIG’s CEO Says Insurer Can Still Repay Taxpayers,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2009, 11:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103
&sid=ahykOmEesvWk&refer=us. AIG underwrote $450 billion of credit default swaps that obli-
gated it to pay on pools of securities in the event that the primary obligees failed to pay. Lilla Zuill
& Kristina Cooke, AIG Failure Would Be Disastrous for Global Markets, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2009,
8:57 AM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/stocksAndSharesNews/idUKLNE52101v620090302. The
government pumped $200 billion into AIG. Id.
114. Economic and Budget Challenges for the Short and Long Term: Hearing Before the S.
Budget Comm., 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors
of the Fed. Res. Sys.).
115. President’s Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Overview: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
and Means, 111th Cong., 3 (2009) (statement of Timothy Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Treasury), availa-
ble at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=7849.
116. Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. and U.S. Dep’t of the Trea-
sury, U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Board Announce Participation in AIG Restructuring Plan
(Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20090302a.htm.
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AIG’s losses arose from credit default swaps (CDS) whereby the firm
assumed the risk of loss on pools of subprime related securities.117 Essen-
tially, the firm acted as credit insurer, yet the credit default swaps were not
insurance and AIG assumed these risks through an unregulated subsidiary,
meaning it did not have to reserve fully against future losses nor carry any
capital to fund potential losses.118 The fees generated from the credit default
swaps were consequently free income with little associated expense.119 AIG
literally gambled its viability away in the name of short-term profits.120
When the market for subprime securities crashed, AIG absorbed huge
losses in the form of obligations to subprime investors.121 The short-term
profits were used to fund a $600 million bonus pool for the officers in
charge of the unit that underwrote the credit default swaps.122 The CEO
who managed AIG into this subprime mess was paid $47 million in sever-
ance pay when he was discharged.123 The U.S. government effectively
seized control in late 2008, at a cost of billions to U.S. taxpayers.124
The essential problem at AIG involved a failure of risk management.
The firm’s management simply concluded that the risks of ever being obli-
gated to pay under the credit default swap agreements were so remote that
little risk management was needed. AIG never hedged its exposure to credit
default swaps, and only limited its exposure after it had entered into hun-
117. See Michael Lewitt, Wall Street’s Next Big Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/opinion/16lewitt.html (defining credit default swaps as a credit in-
surance contract in which one party pays another party to protect it from the risk of default on a
particular debt instrument: “The insurer (which could be a bank, an investment bank or a hedge
fund) is required to post collateral to support its payment obligation, but in the insane credit
environment that preceded the credit crisis, this collateral deposit was generally too small.”).
118. See id.
119. See Stephen Taub, New York: Credit-Default Swaps=Insurance, CFO.COM, Sept. 22,
2008, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/12285201. Ironically, shortly after AIG’s federal bailout,
New York determined that credit default swaps would be regulated as if they were contracts of
insurance, meaning that firms would have to hold capital reserves to secure the obligations. See id.
120. See Gretchen Morgenson, A.I.G., Where Taxpayers’ Dollars Go to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/business/08gret.html (explaining that AIG obligated
itself to assume up to $440 billion in credit default swaps, which was more than twice its total
market value of $200 billion. “That means the geniuses at A.I.G. who wrote the insurance were
willing to bet more than double their company’s value that defaults would not become problem-
atic. That’s some throw of the dice. Too bad it came up snake eyes for taxpayers.”).
121. By the end of 2008, AIG had lost $61.7 billion due to its subprime related securities.
David Glovin & Joel Rosenblatt, Maurice Greenberg Sues AIG Over ‘Inflated’ Shares, BLOOM-
BERG (Mar. 2, 2009, 9:20 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aHDo
c7YcjQZI&refer=home.
122. Lilla Zuill, NY AG Says Targeting Exec Pay at AIG, Elsewhere, REUTERS, Oct. 22, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE49L6I420081022.
123. Id. It is not clear how much of compensation will ultimately be paid to the AIG execu-
tives because their pay is being challenged by the Attorney General of New York. Id. “It is not
just compensation, but incentives—perverse incentives for executives to produce (short-term)
profit rather than long-term growth.” Id. (quoting New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo).
124. See Brady Dennis, AIG Posts $61.7 Billion Loss, Faces Grim Future, WASH. POST, Mar.
3, 2009, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-19952696.html.
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dreds of billions in agreements.125 The OTS leveled criticisms regarding
“risk management, corporate oversight, and financial reporting, culminating
in [a] Supervisory Letter issued by OTS in March 2008, which downgraded
AIG’s examination rating.”126 The firm’s auditors found similar problems
and alerted the firm to material weaknesses in risk management.127 In par-
ticular, the firm suffered from severe liquidity risk and was unable to meet
collateral calls in accordance with the CDS agreements.128 In fact, the OTS
“in hindsight” now maintains that if the liquidity risks of the CDS agree-
ments had been properly assessed, AIG would have been ordered to reduce
its CDS exposure.129 This risk mismanagement cost shareholders dearly:
the shares of AIG traded as high as $70 per share in 2007 and as of its latest
bailout the shares traded for less than $2.130
AIG deceived its shareholders of the risks in its CDS exposure. On
August 9, 2007, for the first time, AIG disclosed the $79 billion in CDS
exposure in an investor conference call, including $64 billion backed by
subprime mortgages. During the call, Joseph Cassano, the CEO of AIG Fi-
nancial Products, stated that “without being flippant” it is hard to conceive
of a scenario where AIG would lose “$1 in any of these transactions.”131
Senior Vice President and Chief Risk Officer Robert Lewis assured inves-
tors: “We believe that it would take declines in housing values to reach
depression proportions, along with default frequencies never experienced,
before our . . . investments would be impaired.”132 At the time these state-
ments were made, AIG had already paid $1.2 billion in cash to Goldman
Sachs (with another slug of cash to be paid the next day) in response to
collateral calls required under the contractual terms of the CDS. These pay-
ments were not mentioned to investors.133 On December 5, 2007, with the
125. Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASH. POST, Dec. 31,
2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/30/AR2008123003431
.html.
126. American International Group’s Impact on the Global Economy: Before, During, and
After Federal Intervention: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins., and Gov’t
Sponsored Enter., Comm. on Fin. Serv., 11th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of Scott M. Polakoff,
Acting Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision) [hereinafter OTS Statement].
127. See Downgrades and Downfall, supra note 125.
128. Id. On Feb. 6, 2008, AIG’s auditing firm alerted the chairman of AIG’s board of material
weaknesses in internal control involving its ability to value the CDS portfolio. The auditors im-
pugned management generally and its ERM program in particular. The next day the auditor in-
formed the AIG audit committee of these facts. AIG disclosed the material weaknesses in internal
control to its investors on Feb. 11, 2008, and its stock plunged. FCIC, supra note 87, at 272–74.
129.  See OTS Statement, supra note 126, at 6.
130. Matt Krantz, AIG: Removal from Dow Index is the Least of Your Worries, USA TODAY,
Oct. 6, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/columnist/krantz/2008-10-06-aig-stock-
dow_N.htm; Jonathan Stempel & Lilla Zuill, AIG Has $61.7 Billion Loss, New US Aid May Not
Be Last, REUTERS, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSN0134457520090302.
131. Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer’s Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/business/28melt.html.
132. FCIC, supra note 87, at 268.
133. Id.
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subprime market now rapidly unraveling, AIG’s CEO told investors “we
believe the probability that [our residential real estate investments] will sus-
tain an economic loss is close to zero.”134 At the time its payments to
Goldman alone already totaled $2 billion.135 This fundamental failure to
disclose risk alone justifies the Economist in stating that AIG presents “per-
haps the biggest failure of risk management in the crisis.”136 As for Joesph
Cassano, he retains the $315 million he garnered during his twenty-one-
year tenure at AIG, and even obtained a $1 million per month consulting
payment from AIG after discharge.137
Lehman Brothers presents another case of manifest risk mismanage-
ment. Major problems with real estate emerged in the summer of 2007.
Nevertheless, on October 7, 2007, when commercial real estate already
made up over 6 percent of its assets, Lehman Brothers invested $5.4 billion
in Archstone Smith, a publicly traded real estate firm.138 It was the bank’s
largest commercial real estate investment.139 Lehman claimed that “Risk
Management is at the very core” of its business.140 Yet, according to the
FCIC “the Executive Committee simply left its risk officer, Madelyn
Antoncic, out of the loop when it made this investment.”141
Earlier, in the summer of 2006, senior management—in defiance of
the firm’s risk policies and warnings from risk managers—invested in more
home mortgage assets.142 Ultimately, the mortgage-related assets on Leh-
man’s books nearly doubled from 2006 to 2007 to over $100 billion.143
These risky investments rested on a capital foundation of short-term
134. Id. at 272.
135. “Cassano did not reveal the $2 billion collateral posted to Goldman, the several hundred
million dollars posted to other counterparties, and the daily demands from Goldman and the others
for additional cash.” Id.
136. The Joe Cassano Guide to Escapology, ECONOMIST, July 1, 2010, http://www.economist
.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/07/financial_crisis_inquiry_commission.
137. No Ordinary Joe, ECONOMIST (July 1, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/16485620.
Similarly, the AIG CEO was paid $107 million over four years and received a severance package
of $18 million, despite its auditors criticism of his risk management function. FCIC, supra note
87, at 273.
138. “Lehman, in a 50-50 partnership with Bank of America, put up $17.1 billion of debt and
$4.6 billion in bridge equity financing.” Devin Leonard, How Lehman Got Its Real Estate Fix,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/03/business/03real.html (stating also
that Lehman had $5.4 billion in exposure).
139. FCIC, supra note 87, at 176.
140. Id. at 177.
141. Id.
142. Edward J. Estrada, The Immediate and Lasting Impacts of the 2008 Economic Collapse—
Lehman Brothers, General Motors, and the Secured Credit Markets, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1111,
1115–16 (2011) (citing Report of Anton R. Valukas, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-
13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010)).
143. See generally Wyo. State Treasurer v. Moody’s Investors Serv. (In re Lehman Bros.
Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2011) (“In the period from 2005 to 2007,
[Lehman Bros.] and similarly situated persons purchased approximately $155 billion worth of
mortgage pass-through certificates”).
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debt.144 Lehman understated its leverage through accounting manipula-
tions.145 Martin Kelly, Lehman’s global financial controller, stated that the
transactions had “no substance” and other officers openly acknowledged the
manipulation was no more than an “accounting gimmick.”146 Lehman’s
president and chief operating officer termed the accounting machinations
“another drug” that Lehman used to conceal its actual financial
condition.147
Lehman’s toxic investment on a highly leveraged capital base proved
fatal. On September 15, 2008, it entered bankruptcy, setting off the worst
phase of the financial crisis.148 The OTS found that Lehman made an “out-
sized bet” on real estate and suffered from “major failings in its risk man-
agement process.”149 Unfortunately, this regulatory warning only came in
July of 2008—two months before Lehman entered bankruptcy.150 As for
Chief Risk Officer Antoncic, she was shunted aside, ignored, and ultimately
moved out of her risk manager position in 2007 after three years.151
At Citigroup, Richard Bowen, a veteran banker, received a promotion
in early 2006 when he was named business chief underwriter.152 He over-
saw loan quality for $90 billion per year of mortgages underwritten and
purchased by CitiFinancial.153 Bowen discovered that up to 60 percent of
the loans purchased did not meet Citigroup’s loan guidelines.154 Bowen
tried to alert senior management but the efforts “never translated into any
action.”155 Instead, in order to build volume, “there was a considerable
push” to loosen underwriting standards.156  Citi even started to purchase
stated-income loans and “joined the other lemmings headed for the cliff.”157
144. Thomas E. Plank, Regulation and Reform of the Mortgage Market and the Nature of
Mortgage Loans: Lessons from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 S.C. L. REV. 779, 782 (2009)
(“Unfortunately, the regulatory structure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac encouraged [investment
banks and mortgage originators] to engage in the risky business of buying higher yielding mort-
gage loans and mortgage-backed securities and financing those purchases through shorter-term,
lower-rate debt that carried the implicit guarantee of the United States government. In addition,
investment bankers and lenders also held significant amounts of mortgage-backed securities that
they financed with shorter-term debt”).
145. David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance
in Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 164 (2012).
146. FCIC, supra note 87, at 177.
147. Id.
148. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm., Statement Regarding Recent Market Events
and Lehman Brothers (Updated) (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-198
.htm; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill is Sold, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html.
149. FCIC, supra note 87, at 178.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 18.
152. Id. at 19.
153. Id.
154.  Id.
155. FCIC, supra note 87, at 19.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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According to Bowen, “[a] decision was made that ‘[w]e’re going to have to
hold our nose and start buying the stated product if we want to stay in
business.’”158 After he alerted management to the excessive riskiness of the
mortgages, “he went from supervising 200 people to supervising only 2, his
bonus was reduced, and he was downgraded in his performance review.”159
As for Citigroup’s chief risk officer for consumer lending, according to
Bowen, he actually reversed large numbers of underwriting decisions from
“turn down” to “approved.”160
Citigroup also suffered from uncontrolled risk in its investment bank
where massive bets accumulated on mortgage-backed securities. Ci-
tigroup’s CEO Chuck Prince stated in 2007 that if liquidity dried up “things
will be complicated” but that “as long as the music is playing you’ve got to
get up and dance.”161 Citigroup worked to keep the music playing by in-
cluding “liquidity puts” in its securitized pools of subprime mortgages it
sold to investors.162 The liquidity put required Citigroup to repurchase in-
terests in subprime mortgages in the event of financial turbulence.163 Thus,
in late 2007, Citigroup publicly disclosed for the first time that it had $55
billion in subprime mortgage exposure and anticipated losses of about $8
billion to $11 billion.164 Prince resigned shortly thereafter.165 In December
of 2007, Citigroup announced it would assume $58 billion of debts that had
been carried by structured investment vehicles (SIVs) it had sponsored; the
SIVs had invested in long-term assets (including mortgage-related assets)
with short-term funding.166 The risks of these losses went undisclosed to
shareholders.167
The New York Fed found serious problems with Citigroup’s risk man-
agement of subprime exposure: “Senior management, as well as the inde-
pendent Risk Management function charged with monitoring
158. Id. at 111.
159. Id. at 19.
160. Id. at 168.
161. David Wighton, Prince of Wisdom, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2007), http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/fce88e10-8b12-11dc-95f7-0000779fd2ac.html.
162. Carol J. Loomis, Robert Rubin on the Job He Never Wanted, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 2007, at
69.
163. Id.
164. Id.; Shawn Tully, Wall Street’s Money Machine Breaks Down, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 2007,
at 65, 68.
165. FCIC, supra note 87, at 265; Loomis, supra note 162, at 69.
166. Shannon D. Harrington & Elizabeth Hester, Citigroup Rescues SIVs With $58 Billion
Debt Bailout (Update1), BLOOMBERG, Dec. 14, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&refer=home&sid=aS0Dm.iV5BCI. See generally Tim Bowler, The Rise and Fall of
Citigroup, BBC, Jan. 16, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7746077.stm (“If the bank had
been allowed to collapse, it could have caused financial havoc around the globe, seizing up fragile
lending markets and causing untold losses among institutions holding debt and financial products
backed by the company.”).
167. In fact, not even the Chair of the Citigroup Executive Committee comprehended the risks
from these instruments. Loomis, supra note 162, at 69.
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responsibilities, did not properly identify and analyze these risks in a timely
fashion.”168 The FCIC similarly concluded: “Citigroup’s risk management
function was simply not very concerned about housing market risks.”169
The chief risk officer, David C. Bushnell, reportedly told senior manage-
ment that housing prices would need to drop 30 percent (as they did in the
Great Depression) for Citi to suffer serious problems.170 In fact, Citi suf-
fered massive losses and tipped into insolvency as a result of a 4.5 percent
decline in housing prices, due largely to loan write-downs and the liquidity
puts it had written.171 Total losses at Citigroup from mortgages, mortgage-
backed securities, and mortgage-related CDOs would approach $60 billion,
or about half of Citigroup’s capital.172
The above failings in basic risk management represent only the egre-
gious mismanagement at the most high-profile firms at the center of the
Great Financial Crisis of 2008. Other notable instances of risk mismanage-
ment include: (1) Freddie Mac, in 2005, where CEO Richard Syron fired
David Andrukonis, Freddie’s longtime chief risk officer because An-
drukonis was concerned about the risks of relaxing underwriting standards;
(2) Ameriquest, where Ed Parker, the former head of Ameriquest’s Mort-
gage Fraud Investigations Department, detected fraud at the company
within one month of starting his job there in January 2003, but senior man-
agement did nothing and instead demoted him in 2005 and laid him off in
2006; and (3) Merrill Lynch, which became addicted to the fee income re-
gardless of risks from its CDO business, and failed to even install a chief
risk officer.173
Taken together, these narratives illustrate that our current approach to
ERM is deeply flawed. Part III reviews regulatory responses intended to
enhance systemic risk oversight at the intra-firm and inter-firm levels.
While well-intentioned and likely to improve the indisputably weak pre-
crisis risk management obligations, these responses are, quite simply, inad-
equate and do not overcome obvious shortcomings at both of the institu-
tional levels of systemic risk concern.
II. A NEW (?) APPROACH TO RISK MANAGEMENT
On the brink of the meltdown, experts and observers heralded ad-
vanced enterprise-wide risk management techniques as one factor warrant-
168. FCIC, supra note 87, at 267.
169. Id. at 262.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 261.
173. See generally Annette Mikes, Becoming the Lamp Bearer: The Emerging Roles of the
Chief Risk Officer, in ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 71, 73 (John Fraser & Betty J. Simkins eds.
2010) [hereinafter Lamp Bearer] (discussing the history of Merrill Lynch’s risk management de-
partment’s origin and its gradual loss of power).
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ing optimism for the resolution of the subprime mortgage crisis.174 Instead,
beginning in late 2007, stunning failures in risk management surfaced.175
By the time the meltdown transpired, keen observers concluded that risk
management operated as a ruse to conceal and manipulate risk for profit to
senior executives and at great cost to everyone else.176 Wall Street led a
historic breakdown in mortgage underwriting177 and did so with very high
levels of short-term debt (or leverage) on their own balance sheets, essen-
tially guaranteeing that even small losses would send the entire financial
sector (which was highly interconnected through derivatives markets)178
over the cliff and into insolvency.179 The inconceivably high risks at the
174. The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston explained:
I want to note that despite a number of lessons from the recent financial turmoil, we
should not despair, nor should we see investments in risk management as wasted. In-
deed, had the discipline not advanced as far as it has, I believe the recent financial
turmoil would be much more damaging. And as a result of our models and improved
risk management, with some nudges from bank supervisors, the capital position of
banks in the aggregate remain quite healthy.
Rosengren, supra note 76.
175. David Wighton, Wall Street Dispatch: Imagination and Common Sense Brew a Safer
Culture, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/efcf97a6-99df-11dc-ad70-
0000779fd2ac.html (“[I]t is obvious there has been a massive failure of risk management across
most of Wall Street . . .”).
176. Raghuram Rajan, Bankers’ Pay Is Deeply Flawed, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2008, 4:21 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/18895dea-be06-11dc-8bc9-0000779fd2ac.html (“[U]nless we fix
incentives in the financial system we will get more risk than we bargain for. Unless bankers offer
these better explanations, their enormous pay, which has been thought of as just reward for per-
formance, will deservedly come under scrutiny.”).
177. John C. Dugan, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller, Remarks before
the Exchequer Club 6 (Jul. 21, 2010), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2010-84a
.pdf (stating that, with respect to the financial crisis of 2008–09, “at the heart of it all, the worst
mortgage underwriting in our nation’s history”). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
directly supervises every national bank in the nation.
178. For example, AIG, the world’s largest insurance company, entered into $500 billion in
credit default swaps (a type of credit derivative) whereby it agreed contractually to absorb losses
from a variety of credit obligations including subprime mortgages. The counterparties to these
transactions included banks (and bank affiliates) that counted on AIG’s ability to pay on the credit
default swaps to secure $379 billion in bank capital. Thus, if AIG failed, many banks would
accompany it into receivership or bankruptcy. FCIC, supra note 87, at 50, 140. “The government
ultimately committed more than $180 billion because of concerns that AIG’s collapse would trig-
ger cascading losses throughout the global financial system.” Id., at xxv.
179. According to economist Nouriel Roubini, as of January 2009, the entire financial sector
faced insolvency. Henry Meyer & Ayesha Daya, Roubini Predicts U.S. Losses May Reach $3.6
Trillion, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&
sid=aS0yBnMR3USk (“credit losses could peak at a level of $3.6 trillion for U.S. institutions. . . .
If that’s true, it means the U.S. banking system is effectively insolvent because it starts with a
capital of $1.4 trillion. This is a systemic banking crisis.”). Given the massive amount of govern-
ment aid to the financial sector we now know the essential accuracy of Roubini’s analysis. For
example, the Fed made trillions in secret low-interest loans to financial institutions to avert mass
bankruptcy of the entire financial sector. Phil Kuntz & Bob Ivry, Fed’s Once-Secret Data Com-
piled by Bloomberg Released to Public, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 23, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-12-23/fed-s-once-secret-data-compiled-by-bloomberg-released-to-public.html. These
loans supplemented the massive capital injections the U.S. government made under the TARP
program. Andy Kessler, What Paulson Is Trying to Do, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2008, http://on
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\11-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 29 10-AUG-15 16:29
414 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:3
largest and most sophisticated financial institutions inexplicably sunk the
entire interconnected Wall Street financial complex.180 In the aftermath of
the debacle, official inquiries found pervasive disregard of basic risk man-
agement techniques in favor of short-term profits (and accompanying wind-
fall compensation for senior financial managers).181
The manifest failures summarized in Part I gave rise to a number of
legal and regulatory developments with respect to ERM. Part II surveys a
few of the regulatory responses. Generally, the responses might be catego-
rized as regulation oriented responses adopted by federal authorities or
common law based approaches espoused by state courts. While an unprece-
dented volume of nascent regulation has emerged in recent years, we con-
sider three significant legal and regulatory responses here: (1) the SEC’s
promulgation of disclosure requirements regarding risk management prac-
tice applicable to all publicly traded firms, (2) the Federal Reserve’s impo-
sition of risk management committees for large financial institutions, and
(3) the courts’ treatment of common law based understandings of directors’
fiduciary duties to insulate risk mismanagement, short of a showing of bad
faith.182
A. SEC Rulemaking
Governance policies frequently serve as the medium for assigning au-
thority and outlining accountability for a corporation’s activities. Typically,
in corporations, governance policies assign authority to directors, executive
officers and others to make decisions on behalf of the corporation.183 As a
result, boards are often responsible for risk governance.
Federal regulations have long required firms whose securities trade in
public markets to disclose information regarding risk-taking activities as
well as information regarding the structure and composition of the board.
Following the recent financial crisis, the SEC adopted regulations intended
to expand risk-oriented disclosure obligations.184 New regulations seek to
fill the gap between traditional corporate governance disclosures, which in-
line.wsj.com/article/SB122402984044334627.html. Given the amount of capital the government
needed to deploy to save the banks, it is impossible to dissent from Roubini’s essential point.
180. “Too many of these institutions acted recklessly, taking on too much risk, with too little
capital, and with too much dependence on short-term funding.” FCIC, supra note 87, at xviii.
181. Id. at xix. Regulatory inquiries reached the same conclusion. See Lamp Bearer, supra
note 173 (discussing findings of Treasury and banking regulators).
182. We offer analysis of the details of other relevant regulatory responses in another contri-
bution. See Kristin Johnson & Steven Ramirez, Regulatory Responses to the Crisis (forthcoming
2015).
183. DEL. CODE tit. 8, §141(a) (2014); New York’s General Business Corporation Law notes
that “the business of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board of directors.”
N.Y. BUS. CORP. §701 (McKinney 2014).
184. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm., SEC Approves Enhanced Disclosure About
Risk, Compensation and Corporate Governance (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2009/2009-268.htm.
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volved a description of risk taking activities and biographical information
about the board, and information regarding boards’ risk-related decision-
making processes. Following the financial crisis, the SEC moved to force
firms to disclose critical data regarding whether the board and the execu-
tives who serve on the board may have incentives to take inappropriate
risks with the firms’ wealth in order to enhance their own compensation.
On December 16, 2009, the SEC finalized regulations mandating en-
hanced disclosure regarding risk oversight.185 The new regulations require
disclosure of compensation policies that may lead to operational risks and
the role of the board of directors in governing firm risk.186 More specifi-
cally, when a public firm solicits proxies from shareholders it must disclose
the policies and practices of the firm relating to compensation to the extent
that risks arising from the registrant’s compensation policies and practices
for its employees are likely to have a materially adverse effect on the firm,
and the relationship of such policies and practices to risk management prac-
tices and risk-taking incentives.187 Further, public firms must disclose the
extent of the board’s role in risk management, including how the board
exercises its oversight function, as well as the impact that this has on the
board’s leadership structure.188
According to the SEC, “the board’s role in the oversight of a com-
pany’s management of risk is a significant policy matter regarding the gov-
ernance of the corporation.” Under current practices, the CEO often acts as
the ultimate risk arbiter without any requirements that the CEO possess
actual particular risk management expertise.189 Permitting an individual ex-
ecutive to exercise unbridled authority to make risk management decisions
185. Id. The updated reporting obligations require firms subject to the rules to include disclo-
sures in their annual proxy and information statements about:
The relationship of a company’s compensation policies and practices to risk
management;
The background and qualifications of directors and nominees;
Legal actions involving a company’s executive officers, directors and nominees;
The consideration of diversity in the process by which candidates for director are con-
sidered for nomination;
Board leadership structure and the board’s role in risk oversight;
Stock and option awards to company executives and directors; and
Potential conflicts of interests of compensation consultants.
Id.
186. Securities and Exchange Commission, Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg.
68334 (Dec. 23, 2009).
187. 17 CFR § 229.402 (2014).
188. Id. at § 229.407.
189. As noted in 2008:
[C]orporate governance law at the state level gives corporate management autonomy to
implement ERM or to have no enterprise-wide risk management frameworks in place at
all. Boards are simply given the power to manage the corporation as they see fit and do
not have any risk management expertise or controls in place. In the public corporation,
this means that the CEO is the institutional center of risk management. This is the natu-
ral result of broad public ownership combined with the CEO’s power over board selec-
tions and the very minimal duties of board members under the law to supervise CEOs.
Thus, under current corporate governance practices, the CEO is usually a risk silo.
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creates significant concerns. Moreover, CEOs often hold a high degree of
autonomy with respect to the board and exercise authority to influence the
slate of nominees for the board.190 Because of their control over the board’s
operations and decision-making, CEOs may influence other directors to ac-
quiesce to risk-taking strategies that diminish the long-term value of the
firm. Adopting disclosure-based rules presumably serves to create pressure
on the board of directors and the CEO to implement a more independent
risk management function. In addition, proponents of heightened disclosure
obligations believe that such obligations will improve the quality of risk
oversight by encouraging boards to elect directors with appropriate creden-
tials or require CEOs to demonstrate relevant expertise. A risk management
regime which seeks to bring expertise and diverse views regarding risk
management issues to board-level discussions can be expected to strongly
outperform a CEO-centric approach to risk management.191
B. Federal Reserve Regulation YY
Congress responded to indisputable risk management deficiencies and
resounding risk management failures in the financial sector by adopting the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-
Frank Act”). Section 165(h) of the Dodd-Frank Act directs the Federal Re-
serve to promulgate regulations mandating that publicly traded bank hold-
ing companies with over $10 billion in assets create a “risk committee” that
Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 20, at 587. Simkins and Ramirez also identify the key challenges
with a CEO-centric approach to risk management:
A CEO-centric model of risk management need not lead to suboptimal results. Ideally,
the CEO’s interests will align with the shareholders in a manner that encourages appro-
priate risk management. Nevertheless, the CEO could just as easily be tempted to har-
vest enhanced compensation for increased profits today at the expense of large risks for
the corporation tomorrow. Moreover, the CEO is a single person. Risk management can
be enhanced through diversity in perspectives and expertise. Therefore, the CEO is not
the optimal center for all risk management, even if CEO input is essential for any kind
of meaningful risk management.
Id. at 587–88. See also Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L.
REV. 675, 732 (2007) (“The shareholder franchise is largely a myth. Shareholders commonly do
not have a viable power to replace the directors of public companies. Electoral challenges are rare,
and the risk of replacement via a proxy contest is extremely low.”).
190. As discussed below, the insulation between CEO power and influence and the selection
of the board of directors is still incomplete. See also Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and
Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America’s Boardrooms and What to Do
About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1613 (2004).
191. This approach for public firms echoes the proposal of Simkins and Ramirez in 2008:
Firms should be required to provide qualitative disclosures regarding their approach to
enterprise risk management including: 1) whether there is a comprehensive enterprise-
wide risk management function; 2) the extent of board involvement in that function; 3)
whether the CEO controls that function; 4) the breadth of expertise available to address
firm risks; and 5) any differences between management and risk managers regarding the
firm’s current risk profile. This approach to the intersection of corporate governance and
enterprise-wide risk management is fully consonant with the SEC’s traditional role in
issuing interpretative guidance.
Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 20, at 593.
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is “responsible for the oversight of the enterprise wide risk management
practices” of the bank holding company. The Act directs that such a risk
committee include independent board directors and at least one risk man-
agement expert. While Congress acted quickly requiring the introduction of
risk committees, the Federal Reserve moved at a slightly less rapid pace
issuing guidance regarding the new obligations. Several scholars raise note-
worthy questions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the introduc-
tion of risk management committees.192
More recently, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
adopted risk management guidelines applicable to certain financial institu-
tions subject to the agency’s oversight.193 These guidelines mandate mini-
mum standards for the design and implementation of a risk governance
framework for large banks and minimum standards for a board of directors
in overseeing the framework’s design and implementation. In the announce-
ment describing the guidelines, the OCC explains that boards and govern-
ance policies should
enable [an] independent risk management [committee] to main-
tain its independence from front line units. Under this reporting
structure, the board of directors or the board’s risk committee re-
views and approves the Framework. In addition, the final Guide-
lines clarify that a [chief risk officer—CRO or CRE] should have
unrestricted access to the board of directors and its committees
with regard to risks and issues identified through independent risk
management’s activities. The board of directors or its risk com-
mittee approves all decisions regarding the appointment or re-
moval of the CRE and approves the annual compensation and
salary adjustment of the CRE.194
The standards contained in the final guidelines will be enforceable by the
same new statute that authorizes the OCC to prescribe operational and man-
agerial standards for financial institutions subject to the agency’s oversight.
The failure to comply may lead to an enforcement proceeding against the
financial institution.
192. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J.
CORP. L. 265, 356 n.666 (2012) (referencing the risk committee requirements of the DFA); Nizan
Geslevich Packin, It’s (Not) All About the Money: Using Behavioral Economics to Improve Regu-
lation of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 15. U. PA. J. BUS. L. 419, 425–26 (2013)
(explaining the DFA mandate for risk committees); Carol Beaumier & Jim DeLoach, Risk Over-
sight: Should Your Board Have a Separate Risk Committee?, CONFERENCE BOARD, Jan. 2012,
available at http://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB-DN-V4N1-12
.pdf&type=subsite; Matteo Tonello, Should Your Board Have a Separate Risk Committee?, HARV.
L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERN. & FIN. REG. (Feb. 12, 2012, 10:07 AM), http://blogs.law.har
vard.edu/corpgov/2012/02/12/should-your-board-have-a-separate-risk-committee/.
193. OCC Guidelines Establishing Heightened Standards for Certain Large Insured National
Banks, Insured Federal Savings Associations, and Insured Federal Branches; Integration of Regu-
lations, 79 Fed. Reg. 54518, 54518 (Sept. 11, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 30 and 170,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-09-11/pdf/2014-21224.pdf.
194. Id. at 54526.
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The development of formal structural reforms such as board commit-
tees is analogous to the reforms adopted by the SEC and will likely lead to
similar benefits. Independent committees enhance transparency and reduce
executives’ or directors’ abilites to act in a purely self-interested manner.
The creation of operational guidelines and the ordering of reporting obliga-
tions offer more interesting methods of ensuring the soundness of regula-
tion. These measures demonstrate a limited but expanding set of tools
available to regulators to mitigate the risk exposure of individual firms.
Questions remain regarding the ability of regulators to identify and reduce
risk that arises due to the contractual commitments among financial institu-
tions, the correlations among investments in similar asset classes and the
soundness of intermediaries who facilitate the largest financial arrange-
ments in the financial markets sector.
C. Risk Management in the Courts
The starting point for judicial articulation of any duty to rationalize the
risk management function is in In re Caremark, a Delaware chancery court
decision.195 The court approved a shareholders’ derivative action settlement
(despite finding the plaintiffs’ claim to be very weak, and in the course of
its opinion included extensive dicta regarding the duties of board directors,
some of which bear upon ERM).196
One example of the judicial disinclination to hold senior managers lia-
ble for any degree of risk mismanagement is a Delaware case, In re Ci-
tigroup Shareholders Litigation.197 Citigroup shareholders alleged
Citigroup officers and directors breached their fiduciary duties arising from
massive subprime lending losses and that directors engaged in waste
through a share repurchase program and approving a compensation package
for its retiring CEO.198 The defendants moved to dismiss.199 Essentially, the
plaintiffs claimed that Citigroup’s senior management mismanaged risk:
“the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by failing to properly moni-
tor and manage the risks the Company faced from problems in the subprime
lending market and for failing to properly disclose Citigroup’s exposure to
subprime assets.”200 The court held that in order to prevail on such a claim
plaintiffs would need to show bad faith of the directors in mismanaging
risk,201 bad faith to overcome the defense Citigroup directors held under
195. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litg., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
196. Id. at 972.
197. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
198. Id. at 111–12.
199. Id. at 112.
200. Id. at 111.
201. “Thus, to establish oversight liability a plaintiff must show that the directors knew they
were not discharging their fiduciary obligations or that the directors demonstrated a conscious
disregard for their responsibilities such as by failing to act in the face of a known duty to act. The
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section 102(b)(7),202 and bad faith to overcome the power the directors have
to determine to sue themselves.203 The court even held that any disclosure
claim required a finding of bad faith.204 Under Delaware law, no plaintiff
has ever succeeded in such a claim.205
The courts thus move in an entirely contradictory direction from the
regulators and other ERM experts who actually apply the lessons from the
Great Financial Crisis of 2008 to ERM practice and regulation. More than
anything, this illogical and unreasoned exculpation for even infinite reck-
lessness at the apex of our economy reflects the unique institutional context
in which Delaware corporate law is made. In any event, the Delaware ap-
proach (which essentially transmogrifies the duty of care into a duty for
directors not to consciously disregard their duties) approves of the most
egregious risk mismanagement imaginable. The next part of this Article
will assess the current regulatory and legal approach to risk management
from a corporate governance perspective. Moreover, even a survey of di-
verse interpretations of the strengths and weaknesses of Delaware courts’
interpretation of boards’ risk management oversight obligations reveals the
unlikelihood that internal organizational structures will effectively mitigate
risk-taking within financial institutions.206
test is rooted in concepts of bad faith; indeed, a showing of bad faith is a necessary condition to
director oversight liability.” Id. at 123 (emphasis in original).
202. “A plaintiff can show bad faith conduct by, for example, properly alleging particularized
facts that show that a director consciously disregarded an obligation to be reasonably informed
about the business and its risks or consciously disregarded the duty to monitor and oversee the
business.” Id. at 125 (emphasis in original).
203. “Such conclusory allegations, however, are not sufficient to state a claim for failure of
oversight that would give rise to a substantial likelihood of personal liability, which would require
particularized factual allegations demonstrating bad faith by the director defendants.” Citigroup,
964 A.2d at 127.
204. “[T]o show a substantial likelihood of liability that would excuse demand, plaintiffs must
plead particularized factual allegations that ‘support the inference that the disclosure violation was
made in bad faith, knowingly or intentionally.’” Id. at 132.
205. See In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL
4826104, at *23 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (dismissing claims regarding compensation and risk
management and stating that under “the business judgment rule, Delaware law encourages corpo-
rate fiduciaries to attempt to increase stockholder wealth by engaging in those risks that, in their
business judgment, are in the best interest of the corporation ‘without the debilitating fear that
they will be held personally liable if the company experiences losses.’”).
206. See Nadelle Grossman, The Duty to Think Strategically, 73 LA. L. REV. 449 (2013) (pro-
posing that firms should think critically about their management strategies for creating gains, not
just limiting losses, to create additional value within in their companies); Christine Hurt, The Duty
to Manage Risk, 39 IOWA J. CORP. L. 253 (2014) (reviewing the financial crisis litigation, discuss-
ing the lack of a separate fiduciary duty to manage financial risk, and positing that this lack of a
separate duty is desirable); Daniel J. Morrissey, M&A Fiduciary Duties: Delaware’s Murky Juris-
prudence, 58 VILL. L. REV. 121 (2013) (outlining Delaware fiduciary duty jurisprudence and
assessing how this framework has been the basis of recent important opinions and concluding that
the lack of clarity, which stems from competing considerations of the Delaware courts, would be
better addressed in a different forum); Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s The Boss? Unmasking Oversight
Liability Within the Corporate Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199 (2010) (proposing a reform
to oversight liability that defines the “red flags” directors must look for in articulating the duty to
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Regulators’ and courts’ efforts acknowledge the significance of risk
management and the need for a useful method for protecting individual
firms and entire economies from risk management failures. The mecha-
nisms adopted, however, fall short of accomplishing the desired outcome.
Scholars debate the substantive value of boards and board committees. Con-
sequently, it is wise to question whether reliance on such committees or
even demands regarding the reporting line for risk officers will be sufficient
to diminish the threat of risk management failures.
III. ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS: IDENTIFYING
A MORE SUSTAINABLE SOLUTION
As one journalist recently concluded, Wall Street’s subprime invest-
ments easily represent “one of the worst miscalculations in the annals of
risk management.”207 Recent reforms suggest that Congress and regulators
have similarly concluded that faulty risk management materially contrib-
uted to the crisis. Federal regulatory efforts adopted by a diverse array of
agencies in the wake of the crisis include reforms that impose more de-
manding risk management regulations. The latest corporate governance re-
forms continue the evolution in corporate law that has resulted in the far-
reaching federal redesign of the organic structure of the public firm.
Since the financial crisis of 2008, however, even more stunning fail-
ures of risk mismanagement have emerged. For example, in late 2011, MF
Global, a major securities broker-dealer and futures commodities merchant
filed for the eighth largest bankruptcy in U.S. history after dissipating cus-
tomer funds in reckless derivatives trading involving Eurozone debt.208 MF
Global discharged its chief risk officer when the officer raised objections to
the CEO’s trading strategy and the use of customer funds to fund the risky
derivatives positions.209 The bankruptcy trustee in the MF Global case al-
leged that CEO Jon Corzine directed a reckless and grossly negligent trad-
monitor); Eric J. Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A Critical Assessment of the Dela-
ware Doctrine, 58 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209 (2011) (positing that Delaware courts have made it
difficult for plaintiffs to successfully bring duty to monitor claims and that expanding the duty to
monitor will effectively change board members’ behavior towards risk management); Eric J. Pan,
A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 717 (2010) (examining Delaware case law
and arguing that Delaware’s weak fiduciary standard is inconsistent with recent attempts to pro-
mote increased risk management and oversight through boards).
207. Shawn Tully, Wall Street’s Money Machine Breaks Down, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 2007,
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/11/26/101232838/index.htm.
See also Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, supra note 36, at 968 (“The financial crisis
of 2008 revealed serious risk management failures on an almost systemic basis throughout the
business community.”).
208. Matthew Leising & Donal Griffin, Corzine’s Lack of MF Global Controls Exposed With
Missing Customer Money, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 2, 2011, 1:37 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-11-02/corzine-s-lack-of-mf-global-controls-exposed-with-missing-customer-money
.html.
209. James O’Toole, The Risks that Killed MF Global, CNNMONEY, Feb. 12, 2012, http://
money.cnn.com/2012/02/01/markets/mf_global_risks/index.htm.
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ing scheme that broke the law by using customer funds.210 Creditors of MF
Global sustained massive losses in addition to the losses shareholders suf-
fered from the bankruptcy filing.211 Lost customer funds still have not been
fully restored.212
In 2012, JPMorgan Chase & Co. disclosed massive losses arising from
complex derivatives trading in its London office.213 Ultimately losses ex-
ceeded $6 billion.214 A bi-partisan Senate investigation revealed woeful
failures to manage and control enterprise risk.215 The so-called London
Whale trades were conducted by traders in the Chief Investment Office
(CIO) of JPMorgan Chase, America’s largest bank and derivatives dealer.
The Senate’s investigation found that, beginning in early 2012, the CIO
used synthetic credit derivatives to pursue high risk trading, hid losses
through mismarked trades, disregarded repeated warnings of increasing
risk, manipulated risk models, evaded regulatory oversight, and deceived
investors and regulators about its risky derivatives trading.216 The Senate
investigation exposed not only high risk activities but broader, more sys-
tematic failures in basic risk analysis and risk management.
Democratic Senator Carl Levin stated that:
the whale trades show how synthetic credit derivatives, when pur-
chased in massive quantities through complex trading strategies,
can become a runaway train of unstoppable losses. . . . [h]ow
derivative valuation practices can be manipulated to hide losses,
210. In re MF Global Holdings Ltd. Secs. Litig., 982 F. Supp. 2d 277, 290, 296–301
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). Ben Protess, MF Global Customers to Be Paid Back in Full, N. Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK, Apr. 3, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/mf-global-customers-to-be-
paid-back-in-full/ (more than two years after the collapse of the brokerage firm, James W. Gid-
dens, the court-appointed trustee overseeing the return of customer money, announced that he was
sending a final round of checks to make MF Global’s customers whole).
211. Joseph Checkler, Trustee Alleges Corzine Masterminded MF Global Scheme, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 18, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732330850457908370092049
2362.html.
212. Ben Protess, Threatening Letters Sent to 140 MF Global Vendors, NY TIMES DEALBOOK
(Sept. 18, 2013, 9:09 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/threatening-letters-sent-to-
140-mf-global-vendors/.
213. Dina ElBoghdady & Danielle Douglas, JPMorgan’s Admission: A Symbolic Victory for
the SEC, of Limited Use in Private Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2013, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/business/economy/jpmorgan-chase-to-pay-920-million-for-london-whale-trading-
loss/2013/09/19/0c9d7d52-2130-11e3-b73c-aab60bf735d0_story.html.
214. Id.
215. Press Release, U.S. Senate, Comm. on Homeland Def. and Governmental Affairs, Perma-
nent Subcomm. on Investigations, JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Study in Derivatives Risks
and Abuses (Mar. 14, 2013), available at www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/
media/senate-investigations-subcommittee-holds-hearing-and-releases-report-on-jpmorgan-chase-
whale-trades.
216. Press Release, Office of U.S. Senator Carl Levin, Senate Investigations Subcommittee
Holds Hearing and Releases Report on JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades (Mar. 14, 2013), available
at http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/senate-investigations-subcommittee-holds
-hearing-and-releases-report-on-jpmorgan-chase-whale-trades.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\11-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 37 10-AUG-15 16:29
422 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:3
and how derivative risk controls can be bypassed or manipulated
to conceal risk.217
Republican Senator John McCain similarly termed the London Whale trad-
ing “shameful.”218 He added that “JPMorgan gambled away billions of dol-
lars through risky and exotic trades, then intentionally hid its losses from
investors and the public, showing complete disregard for risk management
procedures and regulatory oversight.”219 This reckless derivatives trading
echoes the reckless banking that led to the financial collapse of 2008–2009.
Part I describes the flaws in corporate governance related to ERM that
played a key role in the development, amplification and propagation of the
financial crisis of 2008–2009. These post-events demonstrate that legal and
regulatory responses discussed in Part II have failed to cure the risk man-
agement practices that were cause for concern in the period leading to the
recent financial crisis. While there remains skepticism about the role of cor-
porate governance in the recent crisis,220 most investigations into the causes
of the crisis highlight corporate governance failures generally, and risk mis-
management in particular.221
217. Id.
218. JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivative Risks & Abuses: Hearing
on JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades Before the S. Permanent Select Comm. on Investigations,
113th Cong. ¶ 5 (2013) (opening statement of Sen. John McCain) (“This case represents another
shameful demonstration of a bank engaged in wildly risky behavior. The ‘London Whale’ incident
matters to the federal government and the American taxpayer because the traders at JPMorgan
were making risky bets using excess deposits, portions of which were federally insured. These
excess deposits should have been used to provide loans for main-street businesses. Instead,
JPMorgan used the money to bet on catastrophic risk.”).
219. Id. at ¶ 12.
220. See Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market
Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW 1 (2009) (arguing that firms removed from
S&P 500 exhibited acceptable corporate governance practices but failing to consider impact of
systemic legal frameworks and legal indulgences granted managers); see also STEPHEN M. BAIN-
BRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 13 (2012) (citing Cheffins for the
proposition that corporate governance played no role in the financial crisis).
221. E.g., FCIC, supra note 87; LEVIN-COBURN REPORT, supra note 104, 65–68 (finding that
Washington Mutual embarked on high-risk mortgage lending in early 2005, even as the bank’s
own chief risk officer stated that the condition of the housing market signifies a “bubble” with
risks that “will come back to haunt us” and that WaMu forged ahead despite repeated warnings
that the risks were excessive, its lending standards and risk management systems were deficient,
and many of its loans were tainted by fraud). The Levin-Coburn report found that WaMu was
typical of home mortgage lenders in terms of risk. Id. at 4. See also G-20 Declaration on Finan-
cial Crisis: World Leaders Spell Out a Series of Steps for Regulation, Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Aimed at Stabilizing Markets, CNNMONEY, Nov. 15, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/15/
news/international/g20_declaration/ (statement of G-20 leaders finding that crisis occurred be-
cause “[d]uring a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows, and prolonged stabil-
ity . . . market participants sought higher yields without an adequate appreciation of the risks and
failed to exercise proper due diligence” and that “weak underwriting standards, unsound risk man-
agement practices, increasingly complex and opaque financial products, and consequent excessive
leverage combined to create vulnerabilities in the system”); OECD, THE CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 2 (2009) (finding that “to an important extent” the
financial crises arose from “failures and weaknesses in corporate governance,” particularly in the
areas of compensation incentives and risk management).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\11-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 38 10-AUG-15 16:29
2014] NEW GUIDING PRINCIPLES 423
Essentially, the new ERM regulations attempt to repair manifest defi-
ciencies in American corporate governance law in order to achieve appro-
priate macroprudential outcomes, particularly the containment of systemic
risk. Yet, the experience with the MF Global fiasco and the London Whale
derivatives amply demonstrate that basic enterprise-wide risk management
norms still suffer from a failure to assess, disclose, and manage risk within
the financial sector and even among the largest banks.
While there is some empirical support for the approach of the Fed and
the OCC to ERM in the financial sector for at least the largest banks and
bank holding companies, that evidence (which necessarily precedes the new
rules) only tells the impact of ERM policies and practices at firms that will-
ingly adopt ERM—not firms that adopt regulatory mandates foisted upon
them in the wake of financial catastrophe. We are skeptical whether firms
that do not willingly embrace the precepts of ERM will willingly accept a
culture where CROs can stem initiatives supported by line managers. A
culture change within a firm cannot arise from regulatory mandates alone.
Rather, incentives for compliance must outweigh incentives for inap-
propriate risk manipulation and risk non-disclosure. Organic redesign of
corporate governance can succeed to an extent. In the final analysis, only
incentives will persuade senior managers to forgo risk that can fatten bonus
payouts at the expense of shareholders and systemic risk. At a minimum,
the ERM initiatives of the OCC and the Fed fail to assure that substantive
risk decisions change because the new rules do not change managerial in-
centives regarding risk mismanagement.
Because “systemic risks may result from a financial institution’s own
risk management decisions (endogenous risk) or the risk management deci-
sions of other actors in financial markets (exogenous risk),” addressing sys-
temic risk will often begin only when significant financial institutions adopt
effective internal risk management policies.222 As one theorist has noted,
however, “concentrating on financial institution boards’ risk monitoring
oversight efforts is simply shortsighted.”223
More importantly, “while recently adopted corporate governance re-
forms enhance the effectiveness of regulated or conventional financial insti-
tutions’ ability to assess their internal risk-management approaches and
executives’ and employees’ risk taking activities, these reforms generally
fail to address exogenous systemic risk concerns that shadow banking insti-
tutions engender.”224 As individual firms enhance risk governance, there
remains potential for an individual financial institution’s failure to introduce
a ripple effect of solvency crises across the industry. Internal risk oversight,
222. Macroprudential Regulation, supra note 14, at 914.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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however, must be coupled with broader risk governance across financial
markets.
We describe regulation that focuses on internal institutional risk man-
agement as prudential regulation. Commentators refer to regulation that em-
phasizes a more holistic, systemic risk view of oversight as macroprudential
regulation. Theorists exploring macroprudential regulation often define the
term by comparing and contrasting it to prudential, or safety and soundness,
regulation. While prudential regulation that focuses on the gatekeeping role
of financial institution boards, macroprudential regulation considers endog-
enous and exogenous risks or the internal and external risks to financial
markets.
The increasing interest in macroprudential regulation is, in part, the
result of theorists’ conclusions that macroprudential regulation may help to
overcome the limits of prudential regulation. Because macroprudential reg-
ulation focuses on the regulation of the system rather than the regulation of
the individual institutions that comprise the market participants in an indus-
try, macroprudential regulation enhances the stability of the system. This
approach to regulation offers containment policies that prevent risks from
multiplying across the financial system, and ensures against market failures
or shocks that threaten to disrupt a significant sector of the economy. As a
result, macroprudential regulation is a more appropriate tool for monitoring
systemic risks.225 As one commentator explains that macroprudential regu-
lation aims to “control[ ] the credit growth that normally leads to asset price
growth, which in combination with increasing risk appetite, [is] often
driven by irrational exuberance.”226
Macroprudential regulation is not intended to replace microprudential
regulation; rather macroprudential regulation compliments microprudential
regulation.227 There are, however, obvious limits to the reach of
macroprudential policies. For example, macroprudential policies do not ad-
dress the appropriate capitalization ratios that individual banks should
maintain.228
In a recent speech, former SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro described the
goals of macroprudential policy. According to Chairman Schapiro,
macroprudential policies aim to identify and minimize systemic risk.
Reaching this goal requires two important tools. First, commentators agreed
that there must be a single systemic risk regulator with unfettered access to
225. Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051,1064–1065
(2009); see also Emilios Avgouleas, Rationales and Designs to Implement an Institutional Big
Bang in the Governance of Global Finance, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 321, 374 (2013).
226. Avgouleas, supra note 225, at 374.
227. Id. (“When it comes to safeguarding macro-economic stability, [macroprudential regula-
tion] is no substitute for monetary and fiscal policies.”).
228. Id. (“[M]acroprudential policy may not act as a defense against inflation or macro-eco-
nomic imbalance.”).
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market-wide information. Our regulatory framework is highly fragmented
and, as a result, the creation of a single repository of information is neces-
sary to address the information gaps that exist in the shadow of regulation.
Because the authority of each regulator has statutorily defined limits, efforts
to oversee systemic risk would be undermined without a regulatory author-
ity empowered to review the impact of individual agency decisions or the
effects of market participants’ activities across financial markets.
Responding to the crisis, we would encourage the exploration of
macroprudential regulatory policies. While defining the contours of these
policies is beyond the scope of this Article, we imagine that asking impor-
tant questions may offer the best path to identify an appropriate solution to
concerns regarding the best governance practices to effectuate risk manage-
ment. To that end, we query whether there are structural mechanisms that
may be employed to enhance risk management within firms. As we note
above, the introduction of risk management committees seems to be a step
in the right direction. Concerns remain, however, when we consider the
homogeneity of corporate boards and the important influence that diversity
of viewpoints may have on desirable risk management outcomes. We also
note that none of the proposed structural reforms dismantles the imperial
power of the CEO.
Mitigating systemic risk will require effectively managing both endog-
enous and exogenous risks. If the culture of corporate boards undermines
endogenous risk assessment what types of reforms might improve internal
risk management policies and procedures? Even if internal risk manage-
ment policies begin to reduce the likelihood that an individual firm will
suffer a future solvency crisis, can regulations offer a method for protecting
well-run firms from the risk management failures of industry counterpar-
ties?  Ultimately, we might ask if there is a method by which macropruden-
tial regulation might address the agency problem in the context of financial
institution, i.e. can reforms effectively address the self-interested, individual
incentives of directors and officers?
Commentators have introduced several theories that begin to answer
these questions regarding internal institutional and systemic risk manage-
ment. One suggestion may be to reconsider the current practice of relying
on a single executive or CEO or at least revisit the authority, implied and
actual, imputed to such individuals. Another approach may involve aban-
doning altogether the use of boards. A third proposal posits that greater
diversity among board members may enhance decision-making. Finally,
there are numerous ideas regarding how improvements to identifying risks
within financial institutions and across financial markets may facilitate the
reduction of systemic risks. In a forthcoming article, we offer our best re-
flections on addressing these questions. There may be significant merit to
each of these proposals and, in light of the potential harms and spill-over
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\11-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 41 10-AUG-15 16:29
426 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:3
effects that systemic risks pose, the most laudable idea may be to allow a
thousand flowers to blossom.
CONCLUSION
This Article explores the challenges of relying on flawed corporate
governance and corporate governance reforms to effectively manage enter-
prise risk and mitigate against systemic risks. As a wave of technology and
profit-incentivized compensation structures dominate financial markets,
even basic transactions are rapidly changing. Today, even the simplest
transactions, such as a stock purchase or sale, are executed over high-tech
networks. Sophisticated market participants engage even more advanced
technology and, following decades of interdisciplinary efforts, the assis-
tance of mathematicians and scientists.
Recent proposals for large financial firms from the Fed and the OCC
herald a potential revolution in corporate governance.229 While perhaps part
of the natural evolution for financial institutions whose shares trade in pub-
lic markets, i.e. banking institutions whose boards and executives are sub-
ject to the pressures of quarterly-earnings reports and shareholder elections,
these corporate governance-oriented reforms are too weak to stem the tidal
wave of enterprise risk and systemic risk that risk management failures at
such firms create. Continued reliance on these types of reforms is not inher-
ently problematic. The failure to recognize the limits of this approach, how-
ever, may well lead to even more devastating risk management failures,
market disruptions, and the realization of irreversible systemic risks.
229. E.g., Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered
Companies and Foreign Banking Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 17240 (Mar. 27, 2014) (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252) (implementing the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirements for increased pruden-
tial standards, which includes the requirement for establishing a risk committee), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-03-27/pdf/2014-05699.pdf.
